_Soc._ I too speak rather in ignorance; I only conjecture. And yet that knowledge differs from true opinion is no matter of conjecture with me. There are not many things which I profess to know, but this is most certainly one of them. _Men._ Yes, Socrates; and you are quite right in saying so. _Soc._ And am I not also right in saying that true opinion leading the way perfects action quite as well as knowledge? _Men._ There again, Socrates, I think that you are right. _Soc._ Then right opinion is not a whit inferior to knowledge, or less useful in action; nor is the man who has right opinion inferior to him who has knowledge? _Men._ True. _Soc._ And surely the good man has been acknowledged by us to be useful? _Men._ Yes. _Soc._ Seeing then that men become good and useful to states, not only because they have knowledge, but because they have right opinion, and that neither knowledge nor right opinion is given to man by nature or acquired by him—(do you imagine either of them to be given by nature? _Men._ Not I.) _Soc._ Then if they are not given by nature, neither are the good by nature good? _Men._ Certainly not. _Soc._ And nature being excluded, then came the question whether virtue is acquired by teaching? _Men._ Yes. _Soc._ If virtue was wisdom [or knowledge], then, as we thought, it was taught? _Men._ Yes. _Soc._ And if it was taught it was wisdom? _Men._ Certainly. [Sidenote: _Diviners and divine men._] _Soc._ And if there were teachers, it might be taught; and if there were no teachers, not? _Men._ True. _Soc._ But surely we acknowledged that there were no teachers of virtue? _Men._ Yes. _Soc._ Then we acknowledged that it was not taught, and was not wisdom? _Men._ Certainly. _Soc._ And yet we admitted that it was a good? 99 _Men._ Yes. _Soc._ And the right guide is useful and good? _Men._ Certainly. [Sidenote: If virtue and knowledge cannot be taught, the only right guides of men are true opinions.] _Soc._ And the only right guides are knowledge and true opinion—these are the guides of man; for things which happen by chance are not under the guidance of man: but the guides of man are true opinion and knowledge. _Men._ I think so too. _Soc._ But if virtue is not taught, neither is virtue knowledge. _Men._ Clearly not. _Soc._ Then of two good and useful things, one, which is knowledge, has been set aside, and cannot be supposed to be our guide in political life. _Men._ I think not.