The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elements — Plato — John Shaqi
The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elements
Plato · en
Thus, the following syllogism is a mediate one, or such as requires one
or more mediums to establish its certainty:
Every thing that is not an animal does not breathe;
A tree is not an animal;
Therefore a tree does not breathe.
Here the major proposition is evidently mediate, because we are still
to seek why that which is not an animal does not breathe, which the
following immediate syllogism solves.
Every thing that is not endued with lungs does not breathe;
Every thing that is not an animal is not endued with lungs; ergo,
Every thing that is not an animal does not breathe.
Again, the same science may demonstrate the existence of a thing,
or that it exists, and the cause of such existence as often as it
assigns two immediate reasons; but the one from the proper cause,
the other only from a sign. Thus, he who demonstrates the increase
of the moon, from the plenitude of her orb, infers the cause of such
increase; but on the contrary, he who collects the plenitude of her
orb from her increase, reasons only from a sign, and can alone declare
its existence. And, indeed, it often happens that the _cause_
and _sign_ reciprocate, so that as from the sign we advance to
the cause, demonstration from the cause frequently recurs to the
_sign_. Thus, from the breadth and firmness of the basis, we
collect the permanent duration of the pyramid; and from its extended
existence we infer the strength of its support. Whenever, then, the
argument originates from a sign, it gives evidence to the conclusion,
as from something more known than its cause. When it begins from the
cause, it proceeds from that which is first in the order of nature, to
that which is last, and reasons as from the proper principle of the
thing.
Sometimes the _cause_ and _sign_ do not reciprocate. Thus,
although wherever there is smoke, we infer the existence of fire; yet
we cannot infer, that wherever there is fire smoke exists. Thus, from
the palace and the picture we collect the existence of the architect
and painter; but the last may exist without the first;--the living
architect without the actual palace; and the living painter without
the energies of his art. And thus it is that the cause is illustrated
by its sign; but not always the sign by its cause.
Hence then, as all causes do not reciprocate with their effects; so
neither is it always causes and effects which do reciprocate: because
a multitude of signs, mutually inferring each other, may accompany a
certain cause. Thus, the signs which attend the causes of a fever, are
a quick pulsation of the artery, and an intense heat: and these signs
mutually assert each other; but no syllogism can be composed from
either expressing the _why_, but only simply _that_ the other
exists.