The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elements — Plato — John Shaqi
The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elements
Plato · en
And in this genus of demonstration, the major proposition ought always
to assimilate with the conclusion. But the above axiom is not the
only one obvious, for the following possesses equal certainty; that
of every thing which exists, either affirmation or negation is true.
This axiom is of great use in demonstrations leading to an absurdity;
for he who demonstrates the impossibility of any opposite assertion,
necessarily establishes his own. Hence it is we affirm that the
diameter of a square is either commensurable or incommensurable with
its side; and this general principle is accommodated, and, as it were,
descends into its proper matter as often as that which it possesses of
universal is contracted to a certain genus; for, as we have previously
observed, common principles are not admitted in demonstration without
any restriction; but then only when their general nature is limited to
some particular subject, by which they become peculiar and apposite.
14. [27]Wisdom, or the first philosophy and logic, agree in not using
axioms after the same manner as other arts; but on the contrary,
they confirm and establish their certainty, though with this
difference, that the logician reasons only from probabilities, but the
metaphysician from the highest certainty and evidence. Besides, we do
not rank logic in the order of the sciences, because it is destitute
of some determinate genus or subject, as it is neither conversant about
lines, nor numbers, nor proportions. And its chief concern is about
apparent properties, and not such as are essential to a subject.
Hence, in logical disquisitions, we confidently employ interrogations,
as equally subservient to the affirmation or negation of an opinion:--a
method utterly impracticable, if we only employed those principles
which are universally acknowledged; since it is impossible of the same
thing to prove contrary properties,--as of the soul, that it is mortal
and immortal; but he who demonstrates, assumes one definite part of a
question, because his purpose is not to interrogate, but to trace out
the latent paths of truth. And hence, if any one affirms that the soul
is moved, and immediately after denies it, he is no longer a subject
worthy the exercise of our discursive and reasoning powers.
Again, it may so happen, that the same science at one time considers
_why_ a thing is, at another only explains its existence, or that
it exists, without considering the cause. Thus, the syllogism which
concludes by mediate propositions, demonstrates without assigning the
proper cause: but that which determines by immediate ones, in a great
measure explains the cause or reason of existence. Thus, he who infers
that trees do not breathe because they are not animals, reasons from a
mediate and secondary cause, because there are many animals, such as
insects, which exist without breathing: but he who infers this from
their want of lungs, demonstrates from the immediate and primary cause.