48. “It is proved,” said Cebes, “by one argument, and that a most beautiful one, that men, when questioned, if one questions them properly, of themselves describe all things as they are: however, if they had not innate knowledge and right reason, they would never be able to do this. Moreover, if one leads them to diagrams, or any thing else of the kind, it is then most clearly apparent that this is the case.” “But if you are not persuaded in this way, Simmias,” said Socrates, “see if you will agree with us on considering the matter thus. For do you doubt how that which is called learning is reminiscence?” “I do not doubt,” said Simmias, “but I require this very thing of which we are speaking, to be reminded; and indeed, from what Cebes has begun to say, I almost now remember, and am persuaded; nevertheless, however, I should like to hear now how you would attempt to prove it.” “I do it thus,” he replied: “we admit surely that if any one be reminded of any thing, he must needs have known that thing at some time or other before.” “Certainly,” he said. 49. “Do we then admit this also, that when knowledge comes in a certain manner it is reminiscence? But the manner I mean is this; if any one, upon seeing or hearing, or perceiving through the medium of any other sense, some particular thing, should not only know that, but also form an idea of something else, of which the knowledge is not the same, but different, should we not justly say, that he remembered that of which he received the idea?” “How mean you?” “For instance; the knowledge of a man is different from that of a lyre.” “How not?” “Do you not know, then, that lovers when they see a lyre, or a garment, or any thing else which their favourite is accustomed to use, are thus affected; they both recognise the lyre, and receive in their minds the form of the person to whom the lyre belonged? This is reminiscence: just as any one, seeing Simmias, is often reminded of Cebes, and so in an infinite number of similar instances.” “An infinite number indeed, by Jupiter,” said Simmias. “Is not then,” he said, “something of this sort a kind of reminiscence? especially when one is thus affected with respect to things which, from lapse of time, and not thinking of them, one has now forgotten?” “Certainly,” he replied. 50. “But what?” he continued, “does it happen, that when one sees a painted horse or a painted lyre, one is reminded of a man, and that when one sees a picture of Simmias one is reminded of Cebes!” “Certainly.” “And does it not also happen, that on seeing a picture of Simmias one is reminded of Simmias himself?” “It does indeed,” he replied. “Does it not happen, then, according to all this, that reminiscence arises partly from things like, and partly from things unlike?” “It does.”