On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and On the Will in Nature: Two Essays (revised edition)
Schopenhauer · en
In the professorial philosophy of our philosophy-professors we are
still taught to this day, that perception of the outer world is a
thing of the senses, and then there follows a long dissertation upon
each of the five senses: whereas no mention whatever is made of the
intellectual character of perception: that is to say, of the fact,
that it is mainly the work of the Understanding, which, by means
of its own peculiar form of Causality, together with the forms of
pure sensibility, Time and Space, which are postulated by Causality,
primarily creates and produces the objective, outer world out of the
raw material of a few sensations. And yet in its principal features, I
had stated this matter in the first edition of the present treatise[72]
and soon after developed it more fully in my treatise "On Vision and
Colours" (1816), of which Professor Rosas has shown his appreciation
by allowing it to lead him into plagiarism.[73] But our professors of
philosophy have not thought fit to take the slightest notice either of
this, or indeed of any of the other great and important truths which it
has been the aim and labour of my whole life to set forth, in order to
secure them as a lasting possession to mankind. It does not suit their
tastes, or fit into their notions; it leads to no Theology, nor is it
even adapted to drill students for higher State purposes. In short,
professional philosophers do not care to learn from me, nor do they
even see how much they might learn from me: that is, all that their
children and their children's children will learn from me. They prefer
to sit down and spin a long metaphysical yarn, each out of his own
thoughts, for the benefit of the public; and no doubt, if fingers are a
sufficient qualification, they have it. How right was Macchiavelli when
he said, as Hesiod[74] before him: "There are three sorts of heads:
firstly, those which acquire knowledge of things and comprehend them by
themselves; secondly, those which recognise the truth when it is shown
them by others; and thirdly, those which can do neither the one nor the
other."[75]--
[72] Anno 1813, pp. 53-55.
[73] For further details see my "Will in Nature," p. 19 of the
1st edition, and p. 14 of the 3rd. (P. 230 _et seqq._ of the
translation of the "Will in Nature," which follows the "Fourfold
Root" in the present volume.)
[74] Hesiod, ἔργα, 293.
[75] Macchiavelli, "Il principe," cap. 22.