The World as Will and Idea — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea
Schopenhauer · German
in the abstract the exact angle, in degrees and minutes, at which I must
apply a razor, if I do not know it intuitively, that is, if I have not got
it in my touch. The knowledge of physiognomy also, is interfered with by
the application of reason. This knowledge must be gained directly through
the understanding. We say that the expression, the meaning of the
features, can only be _felt_, that is, it cannot be put into abstract
concepts. Every man has his direct intuitive method of physiognomy and
pathognomy, yet one man understands more clearly than another these
_signatura rerum_. But an abstract science of physiognomy to be taught and
learned is not possible; for the distinctions of difference are here so
fine that concepts cannot reach them; therefore abstract knowledge is
related to them as a mosaic is to a painting by a Van der Werft or a
Denner. In mosaics, however fine they may be, the limits of the stones are
always there, and therefore no continuous passage from one colour to
another is possible, and this is also the case with regard to concepts,
with their rigidity and sharp delineation; however finely we may divide
them by exact definition, they are still incapable of reaching the finer
modifications of the perceptible, and this is just what happens in the
example we have taken, knowledge of physiognomy.(16)
This quality of concepts by which they resemble the stones of a mosaic,
and on account of which perception always remains their asymptote, is also
the reason why nothing good is produced in art by their means. If the
singer or the virtuoso attempts to guide his execution by reflection he
remains silent. And this is equally true of the composer, the painter, and
the poet. The concept always remains unfruitful in art; it can only direct
the technical part of it, its sphere is science. We shall consider more
fully in the third book, why all true art proceeds from sensuous
knowledge, never from the concept. Indeed, with regard to behaviour also,
and personal agreeableness in society, the concept has only a negative
value in restraining the grosser manifestations of egotism and brutality;
so that a polished manner is its commendable production. But all that is
attractive, gracious, charming in behaviour, all affectionateness and
friendliness, must not proceed from the concepts, for if it does, “we feel
intention, and are put out of tune.” All dissimulation is the work of
reflection; but it cannot be maintained constantly and without
interruption: “_nemo __ potest personam diu ferre fictum_,” says Seneca in
his book _de clementia_; and so it is generally found out and loses its
effect. Reason is needed in the full stress of life, where quick
conclusions, bold action, rapid and sure comprehension are required, but
it may easily spoil all if it gains the upper hand, and by perplexing
hinders the intuitive, direct discovery, and grasp of the right by simple
understanding, and thus induces irresolution.