We have seen that, with the exception of the basis of pure logic, rational
knowledge in general has not its source in the reason itself; but having
been otherwise obtained as knowledge of perception, it is stored up in the
reason, for through reason it has entirely changed its character, and has
become abstract knowledge. All rational knowledge, that is, knowledge that
has been raised to consciousness in the abstract, is related to science
strictly so called, as a fragment to the whole. Every one has gained a
rational knowledge of many different things through experience, through
consideration of the individual objects presented to him, but only he who
sets himself the task of acquiring a complete knowledge in the abstract of
a particular class of objects, strives after science. This class can only
be marked off by means of a concept; therefore, at the beginning of every
science there stands a concept, and by means of it the class of objects
concerning which this science promises a complete knowledge in the
abstract, is separated in thought from the whole world of things. For
example, the concept of space-relations, or of the action of unorganised
bodies upon each other, or of the nature of plants, or of animals, or of
the successive changes of the surface of the globe, or of the changes of
the human race as a whole, or of the construction of a language, and so
forth. If science sought to obtain the knowledge of its object, by
investigating each individual thing that is thought through the concept,
till by degrees it had learned the whole, no human memory would be equal
to the task, and no certainty of completeness would be obtainable.
Therefore, it makes use of that property of concept-spheres explained
above, that they include each other, and it concerns itself mainly with
the wider spheres which lie within the concept of its object in general.
When the relations of these spheres to each other have been determined,
all that is thought in them is also generally determined, and can now be
more and more accurately determined by the separation of smaller and
smaller concept-spheres. In this way it is possible for a science to
comprehend its object completely. This path which it follows to knowledge,
the path from the general to the particular, distinguishes it from
ordinary rational knowledge; therefore, systematic form is an essential
and characteristic feature of science. The combination of the most general
concept-spheres of every science, that is, the knowledge of its first
principles, is the indispensable condition of mastering it; how far we
advance from these to the more special propositions is a matter of choice,
and does not increase the thoroughness but only the extent of our
knowledge of the science. The number of the first principles to which all
the rest are subordinated, varies greatly in the different sciences, so
that in some there is more subordination, in others more co-ordination;