The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3)
Schopenhauer · en
But I now turn to a _subjective_ consideration belonging to this place, to
which, however, I am able to give still less distinctness than to the
objective consideration which has just been set forth; for I shall only be
able to express it by images and similes. Why is our consciousness
brighter and more distinct the further it extends towards without, so that
its greatest clearness lies in sense perception, which already half
belongs to things outside us,—and, on the other hand, grows dimmer as we
go in, and leads, if followed to its inmost recesses, to a darkness in
which all knowledge ceases? Because, I say, consciousness presupposes
_individuality_; but this belongs to the mere phenomenon, for it is
conditioned by the forms of the phenomenon, space and time, as
multiplicity of the similar. Our inner nature, on the other hand, has its
root in that which is no longer phenomenon, but thing in itself, to which,
therefore, the forms of the phenomenon do not extend; and thus the chief
conditions of individuality are wanting, and with these the distinctness
of consciousness falls off. In this root of existence the difference of
beings ceases, like that of the radii of a sphere in the centre; and as in
the sphere the surface is produced by the radii ending and breaking off,
so consciousness is only possible where the true inner being runs out into
the phenomenon, through whose forms the separate individuality becomes
possible upon which consciousness depends, which is just on that account
confined to phenomena. Therefore all that is distinct and thoroughly
comprehensible in our consciousness always lies without upon this surface
of the sphere. Whenever, on the contrary, we withdraw entirely from this,
consciousness forsakes us,—in sleep, in death, to a certain extent also in
magnetic or magic influences; for these all lead through the centre. But
just because distinct consciousness, being confined to the surface of the
sphere, is not directed towards the centre, it recognises other
individuals certainly as of the same kind, but not as identical, which yet
in themselves they are. Immortality of the individual might be compared to
a point of the surface flying off at a tangent. But immortality, by virtue
of the eternal nature of the inner being of the whole phenomenon, may be
compared to the return of that point, on the radius, to the centre, of
which the whole surface is just the extension. The will as the thing in
itself is whole and undivided in every being, as the centre is an integral
part of every radius; while the peripherical end of this radius is in the
most rapid revolution, with the surface, which represents time and its
content, the other end, at the centre, which represents eternity, remains
in the profoundest peace, because the centre is the point of which the
rising half is not different from the sinking. Therefore in the Bhagavad‐
gita it is said: “_Haud distributum animantibus, et quasi distributum