Four Phases of Morals: Socrates, Aristotle, Christianity, Utilitarianism — Socrates — John Shaqi
Four Phases of Morals: Socrates, Aristotle, Christianity, Utilitarianism
Socrates · en
Let us now make a few remarks on the theological argument, or the
argument from design, here sketched {78} in such broad and masterly
lines. It is an argument, when taken in the gross, and in its grand
outline, so striking and so convincing, that it is only by confining
the eye to a few minute and unessential points that certain precise
and puzzling minds have conceited themselves that they were able to
blunt the edge of its force. One class of objectors, unfortunately not
at all uncommon in recent times, have imagined that they have refuted
Paley’s famous argument from the watch found on a waste heath, by
saying that there is no analogy between a piece of human manufacture
like a watch, and a living growth like a plant or an animal. Very
true, so far; a growth is a growth, and a manufacture is a
manufacture; the one possesses inherent divine vitality, the other no
vitality at all; but what follows? Not that an animal and a plant have
nothing in common, but only that they have not the principle of
vitality in common; not that the animal may not be constructed on the
same principles of design and adaptation on which the watch is
constructed, but that the animal to the curious machinery has
something superadded which we call life. The fact of the matter is,
that Dr. Paley’s argument would hold equally good if the designing
soul that made the supposed watch, instead of being outside in the
shape of a watch-maker, had been inside, as the principle of vitality
is in a plant; then we should have called the watch a plant or an
animal, and the design would have spoken out from its structure as
manifestly as before. There is therefore no difference, so far as
design and calculation are concerned, between a cunningly constituted
growth and a curiously compacted machine. Another class of objectors
are fond to tell us that things are not {79} what they are by virtue
of any inherent calculated type, but by a combination of complex
conditions and circumstances, which in the course of millions of
millions of ages work themselves happily into a consistent organism.
This is just Epicurus back again in his naked absurdity, almost indeed
in the same senseless phraseology; as we may see, for instance, in the
following passage from the _Westminster Review_, on which in the
course of my reading I accidentally stumbled:--“The positive method
makes very little account of marks of intelligence; in its wider view
of phenomena it sees that these incidents are a minority, and _may
rank as happy coincidences_; it absorbs them in the singular
conception of LAW.” Let us attempt to analyse this utterance. It
is the boast of the Comtian philosophy to find intelligence in the
works of Auguste Comte, but not in the works of the Architect of the
universe. Let that pass. In the next place it is indicated that it is
a narrow view of things which discovers DESIGN in creation; a larger
view reveals LAW; and the few incidents that may seem to indicate