A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Modern PhilosophyCushman, Herbert Ernest
Philosophy
A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Modern Philosophy
Cushman, Herbert Ernest
Philosophy -- History
Besides accepting the psychological analysis of Locke, Berkeley also
adopts without question the assumption common to Locke and all the
philosophers of the Enlightenment,――the assumption of the independence
of the individual soul. “But besides all the endless variety of ideas
or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something that knows or
perceives them――what I call mind, spirit, soul, or self. By which I
do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from
them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are
perceived.”
Berkeley, therefore, (1) agrees with Locke that all knowledge is
derived from sense-perception, _i. e._ he agrees with Locke’s empirical
psychology, and (2) he also agrees with one of Locke’s assumptions,
viz., that the spiritual substances exist.
=The Negative Side of Berkeley’s Philosophy.= We have now pointed out
Berkeley’s general relation to Locke and Hume, and more in particular
his agreements with Locke. We are now prepared to examine the teaching
of Berkeley by itself.
Berkeley was obliged to devote a good deal of time to the negative
side of his philosophy. Just as Locke could not construct an empirical
psychology until he had disclaimed all allegiance to innate ideas, so
Berkeley could not construct an idealism until he had brought to bear
in a polemical fashion all his forces against abstract ideas. Of his
two masterpieces he devotes the entire essay on the _Theory of Vision_
and a good part of his _Principles of Human Nature_ to this end.
1. In proof of this he advances his analysis of abstract ideas. He not
only denies that abstract ideas have a corresponding external reality,
but he even denies that abstract ideas exist in the mind itself. The
deception in abstract ideas arises from the use of words as general
terms. Words are always general; ideas are always particular. There
is never an idea that exactly corresponds to a word. Words are useful
not as a conveyance of ideas, but for inciting men to action and
arousing the passions. Whenever a word is used, what we think of is
the particular sense, idea, or group of sense objects that give rise to
it. For example, the word “yellow” cannot be employed by us except in
connection with the thought of some particular yellow thing. Berkeley
is a nominalist of the extremest type.
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