A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Modern PhilosophyCushman, Herbert Ernest
Philosophy
A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Modern Philosophy
Cushman, Herbert Ernest
Philosophy -- History
2. Again Berkeley seeks to show, by demolishing the distinction between
primary and secondary qualities, that matter as an abstract idea has
no existence. This distinction was as old as the Greek, Democritus, and
was accepted by Locke. We have already described it: of a thing like a
lump of sugar, the sense qualities of whiteness, roughness, sweetness,
etc., are secondary because they depend upon our sensations for their
existence; they are the ways in which our organisms are affected, and
not true copies of things; the mathematical qualities, form, size,
density, impenetrability, are primary because they exist independent
of our senses and are true copies of things. Hobbes had already
shown that such a distinction is erroneous, and Berkeley followed
him by maintaining that all qualities are secondary. The size and
impenetrability of a body depends as much on sense-perception as
its sweetness and color. At some length in his _Theory of Vision_
Berkeley takes up the question of the solidity, or third dimension,
of a material body, and shows that it is an inference depending on
sensations arising from the convergence of the two eyes and complicated
by the sensations of touch.
Berkeley professed to be pleading the cause of the man in the street
who wants a philosophy that is real “common sense.” He maintained that
the conception of matter is only a philosophical subtlety for those
philosophers who seek for something beyond perception. The man in
the street wishes to explain things as he finds them, and not to seek
mysterious abstractions which philosophers say in one breath that we
know, and in another that we cannot know.
Therefore, while Berkeley agreed with Locke’s assumption of the
existence of the spiritual substance, he departed from Locke in denying
the existence of a material substance. Berkeley accepted, therefore,
one of the two assumptions common to the Enlightenment, but he denied
the other. Now Berkeley was trying to prove a thesis. He was controlled
by the ideal of his ardent religious nature to free religion from
false philosophy. He felt that the foes of religion――atheism and
materialism――had employed effectively abstract ideas, which had been
one of the weapons of religion, against religion itself. Berkeley
concentrated his attack against the traditional scholastic conception
of abstract ideas in general and the abstract idea of matter in
particular. Abstract ideas have no existence; the idea of a material
substance is an abstract idea and therefore has no existence. Berkeley
was bound from the beginning of his religious crusade to explain away
the existence of material substance.
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