A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Modern PhilosophyCushman, Herbert Ernest
Philosophy
A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Modern Philosophy
Cushman, Herbert Ernest
Philosophy -- History
=The Association of Contiguity.= This is the most elementary of the
three classes of association, and concerns the spatial and temporal
order in which impressions come to us. Two impressions come at the same
time or in succession, and when one of them is remembered, the other is
likely to be remembered also. We see a man and hear his name; when we
remember the man’s face, we may remember his name also. Hume maintains
that this association of succession or coexistence is given with the
impressions themselves. It is the order of the _outer impressions_.
We perceive the order of the outer impressions with the same certainty
that we perceive the contents of the impressions. _This is the only
certainty we have about “matters of fact,”_――a certainty of the exact
order of our immediate outer impressions. We know the order in which
our impressions do occur, but, as we shall see, when we argue from this
that our impressions must recur in the same order we are involved in a
fallacy. Any order may recur. The fact that the sun rises in the east
to-day does not make certain that it will rise in the east to-morrow.
It is only a matter of probability, however many times repeated. There
is no certain science of “matters of fact.”
=The Association of Resemblance.= This is a clear and distinct
association which is given with the impressions. When we have an
impression, we see intuitively its similarity or difference to other
impressions, and the degrees of likeness and unlikeness. The face of
one man reminds us of another man, or we contrast it with a brute’s
face. _This association concerns only inner impressions_, while the
association of contiguity concerns outer impressions. This has to do
with the “relation of ideas,” while the association of contiguity has
to do with “matters of fact.”
=1. Mathematics.= But there is this difference between the association
of resemblance and that of contiguity――upon resemblance is founded
a demonstrative science. This is mathematics――the sole demonstrative
science. The subject-matter of mathematics consists of the possible
relations between the contents of our ideas――the possible relations
between our inner impressions. These relations are intuitively known
by us, and out of them we get a science of complete certainty. We make
a comparison between the magnitudes in the contents of ideas, and we
analyze their regularity. This is mathematics, and it is a perfectly
legitimate science. Because it confines itself to the relations between
ideas, and has nothing to do with “matters of fact,” it can be a
demonstrative science. All mathematical knowledge is restricted to the
study and verification of ideas, and has therefore nothing to do with
the external world.
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