A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Modern PhilosophyCushman, Herbert Ernest
Philosophy
A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Modern Philosophy
Cushman, Herbert Ernest
Philosophy -- History
=2. The Conception of Substance: Hume’s Attack on Theology.= But the
association of resemblance has been made the basis of a common illusion.
It has been made to transcend its proper sphere of a relationship among
inner impressions; and resemblance between ideas has been taken by
people generally to mean metaphysical identity or substance. It has
been transformed from a relationship between ideas to a relationship
between “matters of fact.” Now substance is evidently not an
association given with the impressions, like their temporal and spatial
order in the association of contiguity, nor is it mere impression of
resemblance. Substance is the conception of an unknown, indescribable
something back of impressions. There is the conception of the material
substance or matter, and the spiritual substance or the soul. How did
such illusory conceptions arise? If Hume rejects them as matters of
real knowledge, he must nevertheless explain their psychological origin.
The illusory idea of substance originates from the similarity of the
frequent conjoining of certain impressions. The impressions――sweet,
rough, white, etc.――occur together so often that the imagination
creates the conception of the substance of sugar behind them. This
arises not from the first experience, but after the association
of impressions has been observed a large number of times. From the
frequent association of ideas arises the _feeling_ of their necessary
coexistence. Thus do we come to have the idea of a material substance.
Hume evidently follows Berkeley in his criticism of material substance.
But Berkeley went only halfway. Berkeley had found that bodies were
only conjunctions of sensations, and he had rejected as meaningless
the unknown substance behind them. He did not see that the same attack
could be made upon spiritual substances. Berkeley’s argument against
the substance of the cherry could be used against the Ego or the Soul.
Have I the impression of my Ego? Can I touch it or see it? The simple
test shows that I know nothing about it, and I cannot affirm whether
or not it exists. But if the conception of the Soul has no reality as
an object of knowledge, how can it be psychologically explained? How
does it arise in the mind? The idea of the Soul is due to the frequent
reappearance of the same trains of thought in my mind. Their similarity
gives rise to the feeling that a metaphysical identity, or Soul, exists
behind them.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account