A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Modern PhilosophyCushman, Herbert Ernest
Philosophy
A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Modern Philosophy
Cushman, Herbert Ernest
Philosophy -- History
Spinoza’s God is the most abstract entity which it is possible to
conceive. All finite things fall outside Him. No quality can be
predicated of Him, for to define Him is to limit Him. After the manner
of the “negative theology” (see vol. i, p. 283), Spinoza refused to
ascribe any quality to God. He does not feel, think, or will as we do,
nor can extension be ascribed to Him in the sense of finite spaces.
We can say only that He is not this and not this. Spinoza’s conception
of God is reached by dropping off all determinate qualities, until the
most general and most abstract term is gained. The barrenness of this
logical conception, its absolute emptiness and abstractness, makes all
description of it impossible. God is a bloodless entity, an absolute
logical necessity and the most abstract universal. Outside of Him falls
all that we call life. If this is God’s character, is He everything
or nothing? If the process of abstraction rises so far above every
limitation to an _ens realissimum et generalissimum_,――to the most
real and most general entity,――if all content falls away from God,
what does such an empty form amount to? The paradox in Spinoza’s
philosophy appears here as in the case of all mysticism――for the mystic
revels in paradoxes. This empty generality is all that really is.
God is everything, and Spinoza points out empirical proof of this by
insisting that the transitory life of man has its only meaning in such
a substance. God is not this particular thing nor again that finite
determination, but He is all these. He is the timeless reality of
the temporal world, the infinity of finite things, the necessity of
contingent nature. When therefore Spinoza speaks of God as having an
intellectual love for Himself, and when he says that the attributes
of thought and extension constitute the essence of the substance, he
is not giving finite characteristics to God. He is struggling with
language to express the inherent paradox of his philosophy.
Moreover, the delineation of the finite world with God as a background,
as it appears from the point of view of a human being, is an inadequate
presentation of Spinoza’s profound conception of God. For the substance
is not merely a neutral point nor the central point of the universe.
The substance is all. All things have neither their explanation nor
their existence in themselves. God alone has an existence that explains
itself, and He is the reality and essence of all finite things. God
is immanent in the world. Just as the sides of a triangle get their
meaning from the triangle itself, so the significance of the attributes
and modes of the substance lies in the substance.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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