A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Modern PhilosophyCushman, Herbert Ernest
Philosophy
A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Modern Philosophy
Cushman, Herbert Ernest
Philosophy -- History
How vital, therefore, does life now appear, with its mechanical members
transformed into living units! Universal striving or force fills nature,
and the surging of individual forces gives a new meaning to the unity
of the whole. The mechanical series――the physiological changes of our
bodies and the efficient causes in nature――are only the expression
of the inner teleological development. Leibnitz points out several
pregnant principles that are aspects of this preëstablished but
intrinsic harmony. In the first place, nature has no breaks and abhors
a vacuum; and the series is a continuous one,――_the law of continuity_.
Member follows member in continuous and graded order. Their qualitative
differences are differences of quality of activity. Rest and motion,
good and evil, are differences of degree. In the second place, there
is nothing superfluous; no two things in nature are alike. If they
were alike, they would be identical――_the law of the identity of
indiscernibles_. Although there is no absolute antithesis or contrast
between things, there is no absolute likeness. Every monad must be
differentiated from every other intrinsically, _i. e._ according to
its perfected activity. Therefore, in the third place, every member
has an excuse for being――_the law of sufficient reason_. Every member
has its part to perform and no other can act as an understudy for it.
However insignificant any member may appear to be, it is as unique as
its bigger neighbor.
=The Superimposed Unity of the Monads――The Theological Unity.= The
intrinsic unity of the monads is derived naturally from the monads
themselves, but it is an unattained ideal for which they strive. When
Leibnitz turns his philosophy into a theodicy, or justification of the
nature of God, this unity of the world takes on a different form and
assumes a theological importance. The unity is no longer an intrinsic
unity, with no actual but only ideal existence depending upon the
highest monad in the series, but is an actual personality who exists
apart from the world. The world is his eternal purpose. Probably this
conception was always in the background of Leibnitz’s thought, but it
cannot be deduced from his philosophy. It is a conception afterwards
superimposed upon his philosophy. Leibnitz now conceives God not as an
ideal goal, but as a perfect and actual person, whose reason impelled
Him to construct the best possible world. The world in which we live
is the world He chose. It is perfectly conceivable that the world could
be different. Why, among all the possible worlds, did God choose to
construct this world? There is no reason in logic, but in fact. There
was no necessity for its construction. The fact is the excellence of
the world. Spinoza said that all possible worlds exist. Leibnitz said
this best possible world exists. Look about you; is it not so?
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account