selves may be wholly separate in experience, so that one self has no knowledge or memory of the experiences of another. Here, therefore, the abnormal is a more trenchant and clean-cut figure of the normal; it is the normal carried, so to say, to its logical extreme. The judge delivering a charge does not think of his golf, and the irritated golf-player does not think of his charge; but in the abnormal cases the division may be complete; the one ‘personality’ _cannot_ think of the other. _If, then, there are facts which look toward the persistence and continuity and stability of the self, there are also other facts which look toward impermanence and discontinuity and instability._ Common sense has laid stress upon the positive evidence, and has enshrined in language the concept of a persistent and continuous self. This one-sided attitude, as we are now to see, has had its effect upon psychology. We have carried the present analysis only so far as was necessary for our own purposes; the full psychological discussion of the self of common sense belongs, as we said just now, to another branch of the science. § 75. =The Self in Experience.=—So far, we have been discussing the psychological self as viewed, so to say, from the outside; we have found out what the word ‘self’ means when it is used as a technical term like ‘mind’ or ‘memory.’ We have now to raise a different question, and to ask: _How is_ =myself= _represented in experience?_ There are very many occasions when the organism is, literally, thrown back on _itself_, when it meets a situation by a _self_-response; what mental processes are then involved?