Self, in such cases, is a meaning; and, in principle, _any mental process whatsoever may represent the self_ (or the phase or feature of the self that is called forth by the situation) _if its context and determination carry the meaning of selfhood_. We can hardly expect, however, that the context and determination will be explicit, a group of mental processes lying open to observation. For the meaning of self is very old in human history; and we learn from early childhood to speak a language in which it is already stereotyped, a language which bristles with _I_ and _my_. We shall say more about language later. Meantime, you see that these are just the circumstances in which context and determination cease to be explicit, and reduce to a set or disposition of the nervous system (p. 120). Hence we must be satisfied to distinguish the _forms_ in which the self-experience appears, and to discover what _particular mental processes_, if any, fall characteristically into these self-forms. In other words, we enquire whether the self-meaning attaches to a perception, or an idea, or a feeling, and so on down the list; and we enquire also whether the self-perception or self-idea, or whatever the form may be, is characteristically visual or auditory or kinæsthetic, and so on. In principle, remember, any form and any kind of process may represent the self, provided that the self-context and the self-determination are somehow there; we are now to gather observations, and to see what forms and what processes do, in fact, represent the self in our experience.