Having thus cleared the ground of bad argument, we may turn to the facts of observation. The question whether the self-experience is or is not continuous we leave, for the moment, entirely open. We ask, first: _In what form or forms does this self-experience occur?_ and the answer is: In all possible forms. We may _perceive_ ourself, as when we consult the glass to make sure that we look all right; we may have an _idea_ of ourself, in memory or imagination; we may have a _feeling_ of self, when we are lonely or vexed or ill at ease; we may have a _concept_ of self, as when we say emphatically in conversation ‘_I_ can’t conceive of so-and-so’; we may have all sorts of _self-attitudes_, intellectual and emotive. Any form of mental connection may appear under a determination, or in a context, that gives it the meaning of self; only be clear that it is always the determination or context, and not the form, which is recept; ponsible for the selfness of the experience. We look in the glass, time and again, without having a self-perception; and we are often lonely and uncomfortable, without having a self-feeling; and we may say ‘I’ a hundred times over, without having a self-concept. The setting is what gives the self-meaning to the experience. We ask, secondly: _Are there any particular mental processes that enter characteristically into the self-forms?_ and here the answer is less easy. We have seen that language has a large number of self-words ready made for us to use; and we learn in our early years—sometimes painfully enough—to connect the self with our body. So the perceived self tends to be a visual perception of the body, or of some part of it; the felt self tends to be a blend of feeling with kinæsthetic and organic sensation (these processes are, indeed, regular components of feelings and mental attitudes); while the conceived self is, of course, a matter of verbal perception and idea,—ordinarily, that is, a matter of auditory-kinæsthetic complexes. If, however, these processes are characteristic, we have no evidence that they are essential; continued observation would probably show that the self-meaning may attach to all sorts of processes, as it is carried by all sorts of forms, so that tones and touches, tastes and smells, may on occasion come to us as the experienced Me. On the whole, therefore, what holds in principle of the _form of the self-experience_ holds also in observable fact; the experience may take all possible forms; though, in a given mind, some forms may appear more frequently than others. Within the different forms, on the other hand, there seems to be a tendency toward the appearance of _particular mental processes_, those concerned in the visual perception of the body, in felt organic stir and in verbal perceptions and ideas. And now, _what of continuity_?