Let us begin, however, by clearing out of the way certain =erroneous views= that have appeared in psychology under the influence of common sense. Since the self of common sense is persistent, it has been argued that the self-experience must also be continuous; and psychologists, instead of going to the facts, have tried to find a basis in experience for this supposed continuity. _It is sometimes said, for instance, that all mental processes alike are essentially self-processes_; _because_ they are processes within a particular psychological world, _because_ they belong to a self, _therefore_ they have the character of selfness stamped upon them, and are known and experienced as processes-of-me. Does that view seem to you to be natural and reasonable? But consider the logic of it; try a parallel argument! We might as well say that _because_ every native-born American belongs to the group of American citizenship, _therefore_ he is always aware that he is an American citizen; or that _because_ a certain man is wealthy, _therefore_ he is always aware of his possessions. The fallacy is plain. _It is sometimes said, again, that not all mental processes alike, but only the feeling-processes_—sense-feelings, emotions, sentiments, feeling-attitudes—_have this character of selfness stamped upon them_; the feelings are ‘subjective’ experiences, and therefore being with them a reference to the self. The confusion is the same as that which we have just pointed out; it is argued that, because all the feeling-processes _are_ subjective (we need not enquire too curiously what that word means!), therefore they must always _mean_ the great subjective thing, the self; because a man _is_ wealthy, therefore his wealth must always _mean_ wealth to him; whereas it may, in various circumstances, mean an oil-painting or a steam-yacht. There is, however, another objection. This view maintains that feeling-processes of some kind are always present in experience; otherwise, indeed, they could not continuously refer to self; but observation shows that much of our experience is indifferent, without tinge of feeling. _It is sometimes said, once more, that the organic sensations are the peculiar self-experiences_; they are always with us, forming a constant background of self, upon which our other and less stable experiences come and go. But it may be doubted whether these sensations are continuous; at any rate, they vary enormously in intensity and in their appeal to the attention. An experience of nausea is overwhelming; but need there be, in perfect health, any sensation whatever from heart-beat or breathing or digestion? Moreover, the logic of the position is still unsound. For a continuous experience is not necessarily the experience of something continuous; the fact that a man is all the while wealthy does not imply that he is continually realising his wealth.