(1.) That we have not the least similitude, or resemblance, of this in any finite being. Every thing below God is composed of parts, some of which we call integral, as all the parts of matter taken together constitute the whole; others are called essential, as when we say an intelligent being has various powers or properties which are essential to it; so that it would not be complete without every one of them; and that these are all of them distinct, so that we cannot say whatever is in the soul of man is the soul, but every one of those powers, or properties, taken together, constitute the man; but this is by no means to be applied to the divine Being; therefore, (2.) When we conceive of God, as holy, powerful, just, good, &c. we must not suppose that these perfections are so many ingredients in the divine Being, or that, when taken together, they constitute it, as the whole is constituted of its parts; for then every one of them would have no other than a partial perfection, and consequently the essential glory of one of those attributes would not be equal to the glory of the divine Being, which is supposed to consist of them all; and therefore there would be something in God less than God, or a divine perfection less than all the divine perfections taken together, which we are not to suppose. These are the properties of composition; and therefore, when we speak of God as a simple or uncompounded Being, we cannot forbear to mention them as what are inconsistent with his perfection as such. Neither are the divine perfections distinct or different from one another, as the various parts of which the whole is constituted are said to be distinct; which follows from the former, since the divine essence has no parts; therefore we are not to suppose, that the divine attributes, considered as they are in God, are so distinguished, as one thing, or being, is from another; or as wisdom, power, justice, mercy, &c. are in men; for that would be to suppose the divine Being as having several distinct, infinitely perfect beings contained in it, which is contrary to its simplicity or unity; or, at least, if we call it one, it would be only so by participation and dependence, as a general or complex idea is said to be one, which partakes of, and depends on, all those particular or simple ideas that are contained in it; or, to illustrate it by numbers, as one hundred is one, as it contains such a number of units in it, as are, all taken together, equal to a hundred; this is not what we mean, when we say God is one.