Moreover, when we speak of the divine perfections, as being in God, we suppose them all essential to him, as opposed to what is accidental. Now an accident is generally described, as what belongs, or is superadded, to a being or subject, which it might have existed without, or have been destitute of, and yet sustained no loss of that perfection, which is essential to it: thus, wisdom, holiness, justice, faithfulness, are accidents in men; so that they who have them not, do not cease to be men, or to have the essential perfection of the human nature: but this is by no means to be applied to the divine Being and attributes; for to suppose God to be destitute of any of them, is as much as to say that he is not infinitely perfect, or that he is not God. This, I think, is generally intended, when it is said, _whatever is in God, is God_; which, because it may be reckoned by some to be a metaphysical speculation, I should have avoided to mention, had it not been, in some respects, necessary, since the unity of God cannot well be conceived of, unless his simplicity be defended; and I do not see how that can be maintained, if this proposition be not duly considered. If I have used more words than are needful, or repeated the same ideas too often, in attempting to explain it, I have done it to avoid some scholastic modes of speaking, or with a design to render what has been said more intelligible; but to this we may add, (3.) That when we speak of the divine perfections as many, or distinct from one another, as we often do, and have scripture warrant to justify us therein, namely, when we speak of the justice of God, as different from his mercy, or these, from his power, wisdom, faithfulness, &c. this must not be deemed inconsistent with what has been said concerning the divine simplicity: and therefore let it be considered, that the nature and perfections of God are incomprehensible; and therefore all the ideas which we have of them are taken from our comparing them with some small resemblance that there is thereof in intelligent creatures, and, at the same time, separating from them whatever argues imperfection.