This they assert, as a blind to their ungrounded opinion, and as an answer to that reasonable demand which might be made; If the world was eternal, how comes it to pass that we know nothing of what was done in it, in those ages, which went before that which we reckon the first beginning of time? As for the school-men, though they have not any of them given directly into this notion, which is so notoriously contrary to scripture, yet some of them have very much confounded and puzzled the minds of men with their metaphysical subtilties about this matter; as some of them have pretended to maintain, that, though God did not actually create any thing before that beginning of time, which is mentioned in scripture, yet he might, had he pleased, have produced things from eternity[4], because he had, from eternity, infinite power, and a sovereign will; therefore this power might have been deduced into act, and so there might have been an eternal production of things; for to suppose, that infinite power cannot exert itself, is contrary to the idea of its being infinite. And to suppose that God was infinitely good, from eternity, implies, that he might have communicated being to creatures from eternity, in which his goodness would have exerted itself. And they farther argue, that it is certain, that God might have created the world sooner than he did; so that, instead of its having continued in being, that number of years, which it has done, it might have existed any other unlimited number of years; or since, by an act of his will, it has existed so many thousand years, as it appears to have done, from scripture, it might, had he pleased, have existed any other number of years, though we suppose it never so large, and consequently that it might have existed from eternity. But what is this, but to darken truth, by words without knowledge? or to measure the perfections of God, by the line or standard of finite things? it is to conceive of the eternity of God, as though it were successive. Therefore, though we do not deny but that God could have created the world any number of years that a finite mind can describe, sooner than he did; yet this would not be to create it from eternity, since that exceeds all bounds. We do not deny but that the divine power might have been deduced into an act, or created the world before he did; yet to say that he could create it from eternity, is contrary to the nature of things; for it is to suppose, that an infinite duration might be communicated to a finite being, or that God might make a creature equal, in duration, with himself; which, as it contains the greatest absurdity, so the impossibility of the thing does not, in the least, argue any defect of power in him.