This may be farther illustrated, by considering the case of Mephibosheth. He had a natural and legal right to his life and estate, which descended to him from his father Jonathan, because he behaved himself peaceably, and had not rebelled against David; but this did not entitle him to those special favours which David conferred upon him, such as _eating bread at his table continually_, 2 Sam. ix. 13. for those were the result of a covenant between David and Jonathan; in which David promised, that he would shew kindness to his house after him. Now, to apply this to our present case, if we consider our first parents only as under a law, their perfect obedience to it, it is true, would have given them a right to impunity, since punishment supposes a crime; therefore God could not, consistently with his perfections, have punished them, had they not rebelled against him. I do not say, that God could not, in consistency with his perfections, have taken away the blessings that he conferred upon them, as creatures, in a way of sovereignty, but this he could not do as a judge; so that man would have been entirely exempted from punishment, as long as he had stood. But this would not, in the least, have entitled him to any superadded happiness, unless there had been a promise made, which gave him ground to expect it, in case he yielded obedience; and if there were, then that dispensation, which before contained the form of a law, having this circumstance added to it, would afterwards contain the form of a covenant, and so give him a right to that super-added happiness promised therein, according to the tenor of that covenant. Therefore, if we can prove (which we shall endeavour to do, before we dismiss this subject) not only that man was obliged to yield perfect obedience, as being under a law; but that he was given to expect a super-added happiness, consisting either in the grace of confirmation in his present state, or in the heavenly blessedness; then it will follow, that he would have had a right to it, in case of yielding that obedience, according to the tenor of this dispensation, as containing in it the nature of a covenant. This I apprehend to be the just difference between a law and a covenant, as applicable to this present argument, and consequently must conclude, that the dispensation man was under, contained both the ideas of a law and a covenant: his relation to God, as a creature, obliged him to yield perfect obedience to the divine will, as containing the form of a law; and this perfect obedience, had it been performed, would have given him a right to the heavenly blessedness, by virtue of that promise, which God was pleased to give to man in this dispensation, as it contained in it the nature of a covenant. And this will farther appear, when we consider,