Footnote 9: _We generally say, that whatever is essential to a thing, belongs to it as such. And there is a known rule in logic_, A quatenus ad omne valet consequentia; _and the then absurd consequences, above mentioned, would necessarily follow from it._ Footnote 10: _In this respect divines generally consider liberty as opposed to co-action: but here we must distinguish between a natural co-action and a moral one. Liberty is not opposed to a moral co-action, which is very consistent with it. Thus an honest man cannot allow himself in a vile action; he is under a moral constraint to the contrary; and yet he abstains from sin freely. A believer loves Christ freely, as the apostle Paul certainly did; and yet, at the same time, he was under the constraint of the love of Christ; as he himself expresses it_, _2 Cor._ v. 14. Footnote 11: _This divines generally call_ spontaneity. Footnote 12: _This some call_ lubentia rationalis. Footnote 13: _This some divines call_ voluntas serva. Footnote 14: _The question between us and the Pelagians, is not whether the will sometimes follows the dictates of the understanding, but, whether it either always does so? or, if it be otherwise, whether that which hinders it does not arise from a defect in these dictates of the understanding? Accordingly they speak of the dictates of the understanding as practical, and not barely speculative, and with a particular application to ourselves. They also consider the will as having been before in some suspense; but that dictate of the understanding which it follows, is the last, after mature deliberation; and it is supposed to have compared things together; and therefore presents a thing, not only as good, but more eligible than any thing else, which they call a comparate dictate of the understanding; and by this means the will is persuaded to a compliance. But though this may be true in many instances that are natural; yet daily experience proves, that it does not hold good with respect to things divine and supernatural._ Footnote 15: