I turn with more interest to Mr. Reitz's narrative of the precise differences of opinion which led to the breaking-off of negotiations between the two Governments. Mr. Chamberlain, it will be remembered, said in his dispatch he had accepted nine-tenths of the conditions laid down by the Boers if the five years' franchise was to be conceded. What the tenth was which was not accepted Mr. Chamberlain has never told us, excepting that it was "a matter of form" which was "not worth a war." Readers of Mr. Reitz's narrative will see that in the opinion of the Boers the sticking point was the question of suzerainty. If Mr. Chamberlain would have endorsed Sir Alfred Milner's declaration, and have said, as his High Commissioner did, that the question about suzerainty was etymological rather than political, and that he would say no more about it, following Lord Derby's policy and abstaining from using a word which was liable to be misunderstood, there would have been no war. So far as Mr. Reitz's authority goes we are justified in saying that the war was brought about by the persistence of Mr. Chamberlain in reviving the claim of suzerainty which had been expressly surrendered in 1884, and which from 1884 to 1897 had never been asserted by any British Government. Another point of great importance is the reference which Mr. Reitz makes to the Raid. On this point he speaks with much greater moderation than many English critics of the Government. Lord Loch will be interested in reading Mr. Reitz's account of the way in which his visit to Pretoria was regarded by the Transvaal Government. It shows that it was his visit which first alarmed the Boers, and compelled them to contemplate the possibility of having to defend their independence with arms. But it was not until after the Jameson Raid that they began arming in earnest. As there is so much controversy upon this subject, it may be well to quote here the figures from the Budget of the Transvaal Government, showing the expenditure before and after the Raid. Public Special Sundry Military. Works. Payments. Services. Total. L L L L L 1889 75,523 300,071 58,737 171,088 605,419 1890 42,999 507,579 58,160 133,701 742,439 1891 117,927 492,094 52,486 76,494 739,001 1892 29,739 361,670 40,276 93,410 528,095 1893 19,340 200,106 148,981 132,132 500,559 1894[1] 28,158 260,962 75,859 163,547 521,526 1895[2] 87,308 353,724 205,335 838,877 1,485,244 1896 495,618 701,022 682,008 128,724 2,007,372 1897 396,384 1,012,686 248,864 135,345 1,793,279 1898[3] 163,451 383,033 157,519 100,874 804,877 Of the Raid itself Mr. Reitz speaks as follows:--