A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' — John Shaqi
A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'Smith, Norman Kemp
Philosophy
A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'
Smith, Norman Kemp
Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804. Kritik der reinen Vernunft
generation out of nothing as in anything positive. Similarly, when it is
argued that as all the parts of time and space are uniform, there must
be a cause determining an event to happen at one moment and in one place
rather than at some other time or place, the principle is again assumed.
There is no greater difficulty in supposing the time and place to be
fixed without a cause than in supposing the existence to be so
determined. The principle, Hume concludes, is non-rational in character.
It is an instrument useful for the organisation of experience; and for
that reason nature has determined us to its formation and acceptance.
Properly viewed, it expresses a merely instinctive belief, and is
explicable only in the naturalistic manner of our other propensities, as
necessary to the fulfilling of some practical need. “Nature has
determined us to judge as well as to breathe and feel.”
From this naturalistic position Hume makes a no less vigorous attack
upon the empirical philosophies which profess to establish general
principles by inductive inference from the facts of experience. If the
principles which lie at the basis of our experience are non-rational in
character, the same must be true of our empirical judgments. They may
correctly describe the uniformities that have hitherto occurred in the
sequences of our sensations, and may express the natural expectations to
which they spontaneously give rise; but they must never be regarded as
capable of serving as a basis for inference. In eliminating _a priori_
principles, and appealing exclusively to sense-experience, the
empiricist removes all grounds of distinction between inductive
inference and custom-bred expectation. And since from this standpoint
the possibility of universal or abstract concepts--so Hume argues--must
also be denied, deductive inference must likewise be eliminated from
among the possible instruments at the disposal of the mind. So-called
inference is never the source of our beliefs; it is our fundamental
natural beliefs, as determined by the constitution of our nature in its
reaction upon external influences, that generate those expectations
which, however they may masquerade in logical costume, have as purely
natural a source as our sensations and feelings. Such, briefly and
dogmatically stated, is the sum and substance of Hume’s teaching.[10]
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