A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' — John Shaqi
A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'Smith, Norman Kemp
Philosophy
A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'
Smith, Norman Kemp
Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804. Kritik der reinen Vernunft
Kant’s position, when thus stated, differs from that of Leibniz only in
its clearer grasp of the issues and difficulties involved, and
consequently in the more subtle, pertinacious, and thoroughgoing
character of the argument by which it is established. Its revolutionary
character first appears when Kant further argues, in extension of the
teaching of Hume, that the formal, relational elements are of a
_synthetic_ nature. The significance and scope of this conclusion can
hardly be exaggerated. No other Kantian tenet is of more fundamental
importance.[24] With it the main consequences of Kant’s Critical
teaching are indissolubly bound up. _As the principles which lie at the
basis of our knowledge are synthetic, they have no intrinsic necessity,
and cannot possess the absolute authority ascribed to them by the
rationalists._ They are prescribed to human reason, but cannot be shown
to be inherently rational in any usual sense of that highly ambiguous
term. They can be established only as brute conditions, verifiable in
fact though not demonstrable in pure theory (if there be any such
thing), of our actual experience. They are conditions of
_sense_-experience, and that means of our knowledge of appearances,
never legitimately applicable in the deciphering of ultimate reality.
They are valid within the realm of experience, useless for the
construction of a metaphysical theory of things in themselves. This
conclusion is reinforced when we recognise that human experience, even
in its fundamental features (_e.g._ the temporal and the spatial), might
conceivably be altogether different from what it actually is, and that
its presuppositions are always, therefore, of the same contingent
character. Even the universality and necessity which Kant claims to have
established for his _a priori_ principles are of this nature. Their
necessity is always for us extrinsic; they can be postulated only if,
and so long as, we are assuming the occurrence of human
sense-experience.
Thus Kant is a rationalist of a new and unique type. He believes in, and
emphasises the importance of, the _a priori_. With it alone, he
contends, is the _Critique_ competent to deal. But it is an _a priori_
which cannot be shown to be more than relative. It does, indeed, enable
us to conceive the known as relative, and to entertain in thought the
possibility of an Absolute; but this it can do without itself possessing
independent validity. For though the proof of the _a priori_ is not
empirical in the sense of being inductive, neither is it logical in the
sense of being deduced from necessities of thought. Its “transcendental”
proof can be executed only so long as experience is granted as actual;
and so long as the fundamental characteristics of this experience are
kept in view.
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