sides on which their odor reaches it from one and the same body, it knows their shape. Still, these discriminations are very weak in this power among mankind, owing to the weakness of the power itself in the human race. [For all this, men have not the keen scent that many other animals have, and therefore such discriminations are in men very weak.] FOOTNOTES: [13] Plato’s Dialogue entitled «Timaeos,» 45. [14] The names of the different parts of the eye are: a. al-tabaqah al çalbah = sclerotica, hard-coat b. » » al-mashîmiyyah = choroid, vascular skin c. al-ghashâ-al-shabaky = retina, net skin d. al-ratûbah al-zajâjiyyah = glassy moisture e. al-ratûbah al-jalîdiyyah = crystalline lens f. » » » ´ankabûtiyyah = ciliary, fibrous, hairy web g. al-hadaqah = pupilla h. al-tabaqah al-´inabiyyah = berry, grape coat i. qarniyyah = cornea k. al-multahimah = conjunctiva. [I] perhaps we ought to read «_the ray_». SECTION SEVENTH =Dealing in Detail with the inward Senses, (and the Motion-Promoting Powers).= I. Not one of the outward senses unites within itself perception of color, odor, and softness; and yet, we often come upon a body that is yellow, and perceive at once so much about it, namely that it is honey, sweet, nice of smell, and fluid, although we have neither tasted, nor smelt, nor even touched it; whence it is manifest that we possess a power wherein are assembled the perceptions of the four senses, and have thus become summed up in it into one single form; and were it not for this power we should not know that sweetness, for instance, is other than blackness, since the discriminator between two things is he who has known them both. This is the power which is designated as the common-sense, and the picturing (or representing) power. And were it one of the outward apparent senses, its sway (dominion) would limit itself to the state of wakefulness only; whereas ocular observation attests what is quite otherwise; for this power does at times perform its action in both the states of sleep and wakefulness. II. Furthermore, there is in animals a power which sets up such forms as have assembled in the common-sense, discriminates between them, and differentiates them, without the forms themselves disappearing from the common-sense. And this power is undoubtedly other than the aforesaid picturing power; since in the latter there are none but true (real) forms that have been acquired (obtained) from sense; whereas in this power the case may be otherwise, and it may imagine and picture wrongly and falsely, and what it had not received after such a [wrong and false] pattern (shape) from any one of the senses. This power is the one named imagination.