_Fourth Premiss_: that in the mental form, if regard be had to its division, it will not validly follow that its parts are denuded (stripped) of the totality of its notion. This is so because, if we admit such total denudation, and assert that these parts are utterly aloof from the complete conception of the generic whole, then the form will arise, in such parts, only upon their assembling together, so that they are in fact things devoid of that form which will arise in them on their being set together, which is a quality of the parts of materia capax or passive matter which occupies space ([Greek: dektikon: δεκτικον]); [Note: The recipient is the acted upon, and it is called matter, and also place.]; and hence the division has not been effected in the generic form, but in its objective concrete materials. But it has been asserted that the division has come to pass in it: this too is a contradiction. Therefore our assertion: “It will not validly follow that its parts are stripped of the totality of its notion” is a true statement. _Fifth Premiss_: which is the result of the two preceding: that in the generic form, if it be possible that divisibility be considered in it, then its parts are neither wholly devoid of the perfect form nor are completely exhaustive of it, and are as it were [component, constituent] parts of its definition and outline (or description). Given then these premisses, we shall further unquestionably say that a mentally-grasped form--in short all knowledge--claims some abode somewhere, which abode is both an essence itself and a part of man’s self, so that such essence will not be devoid of being either a divisible (material) body or a non-corporeal indivisible essence. I however say, that it is not licit that it be a corporeal body; because a generic mentally-grasped form, if it abide in a body, then it is inevitably possible for divisibility to befall it, as we have shown above. Nor is it licit that its parts be otherwise than resembling the whole from one standpoint, and contrasting with it from another standpoint, in a word each one of the parts contains somewhat of the notion of the whole; whereas there is no generic form whatsoever but of whose parts a compound can be formed that is partly like it and partly unlike it save genera and differentia; consequently these parts are genera and differentia, and hence each one of them is in its turn a generic form; and thus the same assertion repeats itself as above. Inevitably this will end in a form that is no longer divisible into genera and differentia, owing to the impracticability of progression ad infinitum into parts differing in notions, even if it be established that corporeal bodies are so divided into parts ad infinitum.