A critical history of Greek philosophyStace, W. T. (Walter Terence)
Philosophy
A critical history of Greek philosophy
Stace, W. T. (Walter Terence)
Philosophy, Ancient
But to return to the antinomy of infinite divisibility, {57} on which
most of Zeno's arguments rest, you will perhaps expect me to say
something of the different solutions which have been offered. In the
first place, we must not forget Zeno's own solution. He did not
propound this contradiction for its own sake, but to support the
thesis of Parmenides. His solution is that as multiplicity and motion
contain these contradictions, therefore multiplicity and motion cannot
be real. Therefore, there is, as Parmenides said, only one Being, with
no multiplicity in it, and excludent of all motion and becoming. The
solution given by Kant in modern times is essentially similar.
According to Kant, these contradictions are immanent in our
conceptions of space and time, and since time and space involve these
contradictions it follows that they are not real beings, but
appearances, mere phenomena. Space and time do not belong to things as
they are in themselves, but rather to our way of looking at things.
They are forms of our perception. It is our minds which impose space
and time upon objects, and not objects which impose space and time
upon our minds. Further, Kant drew from these contradictions the
conclusion that to comprehend the infinite is beyond the capacity of
human reason. He attempted to show that, wherever we try to think the
infinite, whether the infinitely large or the infinitely small, we
fall into irreconcilable contradictions. Therefore, he concluded that
human faculties are incapable of apprehending infinity. As might be
expected, many thinkers have attempted to solve the problem by denying
one or other side of the contradiction, by saying that one or other
side does not follow from the premises, that one is true and the other
false. David Hume, for example, {58} denied the infinite divisibility
of space and time, and declared that they are composed of indivisible
units having magnitude. But the difficulty that it is impossible to
conceive of units having magnitude which are yet indivisible is not
satisfactorily explained by Hume. And in general, it seems that any
solution which is to be satisfactory must somehow make room for both
sides of the contradiction. It will not do to deny one side or the
other, to say that one is false and the other true. A true solution is
only possible by rising above the level of the two antagonistic
principles and taking them both up to the level of a higher
conception, in which both opposites are reconciled.
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