A Defence of Virginia: And Through Her, of the South, in Recent and Pending Contests Against the Sectional PartyDabney, Robert Lewis
History
A Defence of Virginia: And Through Her, of the South, in Recent and Pending Contests Against the Sectional Party
Dabney, Robert Lewis
Slavery -- Justification; Slavery -- United States; Slavery -- United States -- History; Slavery -- Virginia
Last, all commonwealths have found it necessary to arm the magistrate
with some powers, which individuals could not have conferred by a
social compact, because they never possessed them. One of these is the
power of life and death. No man's life is his own: it belongs to God
alone. One cannot bargain away what is not his own. Besides, it is
absurd to represent men as bargaining away this tremendous power for
some smaller advantages and securities; because life is the most
precious of all. "What shall a man accept in exchange for his life?"
It is of no avail to say that the community is entitled, by the law of
self-preservation, to assume this power; because, on this theory,
there is no community as yet. There is only a number of independent
integers, sovereignly treating with each other. The community cannot
assume powers before it exists! It is, if possible, still more
difficult to explain, on this theory, how political societies came by
the power of capital punishment, against aliens who assail their
members. But all governments hold aliens living among them, and
invading enemies, subject to their capital penalties. How is this? The
foreigner certainly has not assented to the social compact of this
society; for he claims to be alien, and to owe no allegiance. His
consent, the supposed fountain of all right over him, is utterly
lacking. Once more, this theory draws a broad distinction between
man's civil liberty as a subject of government, and his natural
liberty. The latter it defines as _privilege to do whatever the man
pleases_, within the limits of natural law as interpreted by himself.
And his natural rights are just the same. Some of these he voluntarily
surrenders to society, to secure the rest. All government, therefore,
is not only of the nature of restraint; it is essentially _restraint
upon one's rights_. The advocates of the theory distinctly represent
government as of the nature of a natural evil and wrong, but adopted
as an expedient against the worse evil, anarchy; and therefore the
obligation to obey it has no higher source than expediency. But worse
yet; if there is any such thing as intrinsic morality, government is
an immoral restraint, for it is a _restraint upon rights_. Whatever
good government may bring us, it is of that species which St. Paul
reprobates, as "doing evil that good may come." The great Hobbes was
therefore perfectly consistent, in teaching that there is no original
morality in acts, and that there was at first no such thing as right,
distinct from might. Morals are factitious distinctions invented under
civil society for expediency. Let the thoughtful reader consider how
this monstrous conclusion uproots all obligation, and order, and
allegiance. No man can hold the theory of the origin of government in
the social contract, unless he either holds, with Hobbes, this
damnable error, or with some abolitionists, (who are thoroughly
consistent here,) that _all government is immoral_.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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