A Defence of Virginia: And Through Her, of the South, in Recent and Pending Contests Against the Sectional PartyDabney, Robert Lewis
History
A Defence of Virginia: And Through Her, of the South, in Recent and Pending Contests Against the Sectional Party
Dabney, Robert Lewis
Slavery -- Justification; Slavery -- United States; Slavery -- United States -- History; Slavery -- Virginia
What has been already said leaves our argument impregnable. But so
much misapprehension exists about the two cases, that the general
interests of truth prompt a little farther separate discussion of
each. The two enactments touching divorce which present the supposed
contradiction in the strongest form, are those of Moses in Deuteronomy
xxiv. 1 to 4, and Matthew xix. 3 to 9. These the reader is requested
to have under his eye. The form of the Pharisees' question to Christ,
("Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife _for every cause_?")
concurs with the testimony of Josephus, in teaching us that a
monstrous perversion of Moses' statute then prevailed. The licentious,
and yet self-righteous Pharisee claimed, as one of his most
unquestioned privileges, the right to repudiate a wife, after the
lapse of years, and birth of children, for any caprice whatsoever.
The trap which they now laid for Christ was designed to compel him
either to incur the _odium_ of attacking this usage, guarded by a
jealous anger, or to connive at their interpretation of the statute.
Manifestly Christ does not concede that they interpreted Moses
rightly; but indignantly clears the legislation of that holy man from
their licentious perversions, and then, because of their abuse of it,
repeals it by his plenary authority. He refers to that constitution of
the marriage tie which was original, which preceded Moses, and was
therefore binding when Moses wrote, to show that it was impossible he
could have enacted what they claimed. What then did Moses enact? Let
us explain it. In the ancient society of the East, females being
reared in comparative seclusion, and marriages negotiated by
intermediaries, the bridegroom had little opportunity for a familiar
acquaintance even with the person of the bride. When she was brought
to him at the nuptials, if he found her disfigured with some personal
deformity or disease, (the undoubted meaning of the phrase "some
uncleanness,") which effectually changed desire into disgust, he was
likely to regard himself as swindled in the treaty, and to send the
rejected bride back with indignity to her father's house. There she
was reluctantly received, and in the anomalous position of one in name
a wife, yet without a husband, she dragged out a wretched existence,
incapable of marriage, and regarded by her parents and brothers as a
disgraceful incumbrance. It was to relieve the wretched fate of such a
woman, that Moses' law was framed. She was empowered to exact of her
proposed husband a formal annulment of the unconsummated contract,
and to resume the _status_ of a single woman, eligible for another
marriage. It is plain that Moses' law contemplates the case, only, in
which no consummation of marriage takes place. She finds _no favour_
in the eyes "of the bridegroom." He is so indignant and disgusted,
that desire is put to flight by repugnance. The same fact appears from
the condition of the law, that she shall in no case return to this
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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