We have already seen the uncertainty in which M. de Koutousoff found himself, as to the movements and force of the enemy, at the moment when it was decided to resume the offensive. The accounts derived from the people of the country were contradictory; and the out-posts gave no information whatever. The first disposition made for the advance, was not then founded upon an exact knowledge both of the position of the enemy and the numbers to be contended with, but was solely adapted to the nature of the ground, between Olmutz and Wischau. This disposition was given to the generals, the 24th November. The 25th was the day on which it was fixed to march; but it was necessary to take two days provisions; and these provisions could not arrive till the day after. When _that_ day came, some of the generals had not sufficiently studied their dispositions; and thus, another day was lost. The enemy profited by this time. The evening before the battle, as has been already mentioned, Marshal Bernadotte, as well as part of the corps of Marshal Davoust, reinforced the Emperor Napoleon. It was necessary to recall the attention to these facts, on which we shall yet have occasion still further to remark. The 27th November, at eight o'clock in the morning, the army was put in motion, in five columns, to approach nearer the advanced guard, under Prince Bagration, who, on that day, made no movement whatever, in order that the manœuvre might be concealed from the enemy. This was done with a view to concentrating the troops, which, however, in the end, were diffused afresh. The five roads, by which the army advanced, were parallel to each other. The two right columns marched along the foot of the mountains, to the right of the causeway, and were composed of infantry only. That of the centre was on the great road to Prosnitz; the fourth to the left of this, and very little distant from it; the fifth, composed entirely of cavalry, was in sight of the fourth. In front of this last, the country was entirely open. Here follows the detail of the march. RIGHT WING. The General of Infantry, Buxhoevden. FIRST COLUMN. Lieutenant General Wimpfen. Major Generals Muller, Sclichow, and Strick. 18 battalions of Russians. 1 company of pioneers. 2-1/2 squadrons of Cosacks. 8,320 men. 250 horses. SECOND COLUMN. Lieutenant General Langeron. Major Generals Kaminsky, Alsufieu. 18 battalions of Russians. 1 company of pioneers. 2-1/2 squadrons of Cosacks. 11,420 men. 250 horses. CENTRE. The General in Chief, Koutousoff. THIRD COLUMN. Lieutenant General Przybyszewsky. Major Generals Orosow, Lieders, Lewis. 24 battalions of Russians. 2 companies of reserve artillery. 13,800 men. LEFT WING. The Austrian Lieutenant General Prince John de Liechtenstein. FOURTH COLUMN.