A Detailed Account of the Battle of AusterlitzStutterheim, Karl von
History
A Detailed Account of the Battle of Austerlitz
Stutterheim, Karl von
Austerlitz, Battle of, Czech Republic, 1805
The third column, marched as before, along the causeway, to beyond
Noska: one brigade was posted in the first, and the two others in
second line.
The fourth column, from Dobrochow, by Krzizanowitz, and Brindlitz, upon
the heights of Noska, where two regiments[7] formed in first line; and
the two others in second line. The Austrian infantry attached to this
column was formed in two lines, on the left of the Russians.
The fifth column, from Brzesowitz, by Ewanowitz, upon Topolan: its
advanced guard marched upon Kutscherau, and communicated with that at
Drasowitz.
Upon these movements of the allies, the French quitted their
cantonments. By a signal made from Austerlitz, Marshal Soult collected
his corps there, which evacuated the villages it had before occupied.
The allies flattered themselves that the enemy would not risk the fate
of a battle in front of Brunn. After the 28th, this _hope_ became the
prevailing _opinion_ at head-quarters. Then, instead of hastening their
movements, they wished to manœuvre, at a period, when too much had been
risked, to enable them to avoid a decisive action; if, contrary to the
opinion of those who thought the French would not fight, they still
persisted in not retiring.
We have, hitherto, seen M. de Koutousoff advancing his right, and
refusing his left, with the view of turning the enemy's flank by the
mountains; for which purpose he had disposed the greater part of his
infantry on the right wing. At Wischau this disposition was changed.
He wished to manœuvre on the right of the enemy. A march to the left
was undertaken, which both lost time, and the ground that might have
been gained to the front. The 29th November, the combined army moved
from Lultsch, and the heights of Noska, upon those of Huluboschan and
Kutscherau. It was not till the 1st December that Marshals Bernadotte
and Davoust joined the Emperor Napoleon; and, on the 29th, M. de
Koutousoff might have been at Austerlitz. After having passed Wischau,
the allied army could no longer manœuvre with impunity. The time it
then lost, in making movements, which did not lead it directly towards
the enemy, while it discovered its intentions to the French army, gave
it also the means of receiving such reinforcements as were within
reach. A _short_ flank movement could not answer the end proposed;
while one that was _longer_, would have afforded the enemy an
opportunity of attacking on the march.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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