The Emperor having always had it in view, during the campaign in Moravia, not to allow his left to be turned, and to abandon his right; that alone would have been a sufficient reason for resting his left on a position not defensive, but offensive, such as was that of the Santon. The fact is, the more we discuss the plan of the campaign, the more we perceive the judgment and military eye of a master in the science of war.] BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ. The disposition for the attack of the French army was delivered to the general officers of the Austro-Russian army, soon after midnight, on the morning of the 2nd December. But the imperfect knowledge that was possessed of their position, although scarcely out of range of the enemy's musketry, naturally made the suppositions upon which the disposition of attack was founded also very indefinite. Some movements had been remarked, the evening before, on the enemy's left, but it was not known to be occasioned by the arrival of the corps under Marshal Bernadotte.[10] It was supposed that the French army was weakening its centre to reinforce its left. Several lines of smoke, which had also been perceived the evening before, between Turas and the lakes in rear of Sokolnitz, and Kobelnitz, and some others near Czernowitz, caused the belief that the French army had made these lakes the point of appuy for their right, and had placed a reserve in the rear. The left of the combined army outflanked the right of the French army. It was supposed, that by passing the defile of Sokolnitz, and of Kobelnitz, their right would be turned, and that the attack might afterwards be continued in the plain, between Schlapanitz and the wood of Turas, thus avoiding the defiles of Schlapanitz and Bellowitz, which, it was believed, covered the front of the enemy's position. The French army was then to be attacked by its right flank, upon which it was intended to move down large bodies of troops; this movement was to be executed with celerity and vigour; the valley between Tellnitz and Sokolnitz was to be passed with rapidity; the right of the allies (on which was the cavalry of Prince John de Liechtenstein, and the advanced corps under Prince Bagration) was to cover this movement.--The first of these generals on the plain between Krug and Schlapanitz, on each side of the causeway; and the other by protecting the cavalry, and occupying the heights situated between Dwaroschna and the Inn of Lesch, with his artillery.[11] For this purpose, the five columns, composed as before, received orders to advance in the following manner: 1st. Column. Lieut.-general Dochtorow, with 24 Battalions of Russians, from the heights of Hostieradeck, by Aujest, upon Tellnitz. After having passed the village and defile, the column was to move forward to the right upon the lakes, till its head became parallel with that of the 2d column.