The cavalry, under Lieutenant-general Kienmayer, as soon as the first column should have passed the defile of Tellnitz, was destined to cover the left of the column, and to march between Turas and the Schwarza; observing well the convent of Reygern. It was settled in the disposition, that in case the four columns were fortunate enough to advance as far as the causeway between Lattein and Bellowitz, and to drive the enemy back into the mountains, the Wood of Turas was _still_ to remain occupied by the four Battalions destined to this purpose, in order to preserve the facility of manœuvring round it, and the means of retiring, if necessary, by Kobelnitz and Puntowitz into the position of Pratzen; which retreat was, in case of the worst, to be continued as far as the position of Hodiegitz, Niemtschen, and Herspitz. If the attack made by the left proved successful, then Prince Bagration was to move against the enemy's left, and to establish a communication with the four columns of infantry; after which it was intended to unite the army in front of the village of Lattein, between Lesch and Nennowitz. The defiles of Schalapanitz, Bellowitz and Kritschen, being thus cleared, the cavalry under Prince John de Liechtenstein was to pass them with rapidity, in order to support the infantry; and, in case of success, to pursue the enemy between Brunn and Czernowitz. The general-in-chief, Koutousoff, was in the centre with the fourth column. The general of infantry, Buxhoevden, commanded the left of the army, and marched with the first column. Having thus given the plan of attack, concerted by the allies, we are now about to see the manner in which it was deranged, and how it happened that the faults in the conception were not compensated for by the success of the execution.