[Footnote 11: _Note by a French officer._--This plan was faulty in every point of view. Supposing the emperor not to have attacked the heights of Pratzen, merely keeping possession of the Santon, and the village of Girshikowitz, he would have made an effort in the centre, when the enemy attacked him, and the left of the enemy, once arrived at the wood of Turas, was by that divided from his centre. All this serves to prove, that many men are capable of manœuvring 15 or 20,000 men, but very few know how to derive all the possible advantage from an army of 80,000.] [Footnote 12: Many misfortunes of the allies appear to have originated in attacking with small corps where they had the power of attacking in force. It is obvious, that if _one_ Battalion is inadequate to the service on which it is sent, it will not only suffer severely in the attempt, but that very attempt will apprize the enemy of the intention, and enable him to reinforce. Whereas, by at once attacking with numbers, all opposition is borne down, and the defence, from not being protracted, is generally less destructive to the assailants: wherever the French make an attack, it is in force; and _therefore_ they usually succeed; with the additional advantage, that they are enabled _by those very numbers_ to maintain themselves in what they have acquired. _Translator._] [Footnote 13: Either there were two generals of this name in the Russian army, or there must be some mistake; since, in a former part of this work, General Stutterheim says, "The corps under Essen was at Kremsir on the day of the battle, and was of no sort of use."--_Translator._] [Footnote 14: _Note by a French Officer._--It is very true, that the Austrians fought well, as asserted by the Austrian officer; as also that the regiment of Salzbourg particularly distinguished itself, and lost a great number of men by the bayonet.] [Footnote 15: _Note by a French officer._--General Legrand had only one of his brigades with him; the other, commanded by General Levasseur, was posted in reserve, in front of the rivulet, and of the village of Hobesnitz, from whence it marched on the flank and rear of the enemy, when he attempted to retake the heights of Pratzen; it was this unforeseen movement which greatly contributed to the defeat of that column. Levasseur's brigade fought during the remainder of the day, in conjunction with the divisions of St. Hilaire and Vandamme.] [Footnote 16: _Note by a French officer._--The first column had no longer the means of resuming the offensive. The reserve, composed of 20 Battalions of grenadiers, had reached the heights in rear of the divisions St. Hilaire and Vandamme. (The Emperor, with the cavalry belonging to the guards, was already descending from the chapel of St. Anthony.) The rear of the column was exposed to Marshal Davoust and General Legrand. Marshal Bernadotte, _alone_, had 18 Battalions, not one half of which had burnt priming, and the remainder had been but little engaged.