A reinforcement of 10,000 men was still expected, under General Essen; which, accordingly, arrived near Olmutz, at the moment when the allied army commenced its offensive operations. The corps of Essen was at Kremsir, the day of the battle of Austerlitz, and was of no kind of use. The army under M. de Koutousoff, was certainly stronger than the one opposed to it; but while the _latter_ was concentrated towards a single point, and formed into masses, the _former_ diffused its force as it advanced. It is not in numbers that the only, and, indeed, the _principal_ strength of an army consists; but there are emergencies, and occasions, in which it is absolutely necessary to profit by that advantage; and the present was an instance of the kind. The allied army was under the necessity of advancing, for the reasons hereafter to be detailed. Had it commenced its movement from the day when the Grand Duke Constantine arrived with his reinforcement, forming the reserve of the centre. If, at this epoch, it had manœuvred with rapidity, and calculation; if the reserve, under the Grand Duke, had been augmented by the corps under General Essen; if less importance had been attached to the resting an army, which, after some days inactivity, could no longer be fatigued; there might, perhaps, have been found means, without risking a battle, to oblige the French to abandon their position, by turning one of its flanks; which, by giving this army some uneasiness, as to its communications, would have induced it to move upon Vienna, or Bohemia. The former step would have been attended with danger. The corps of Bernadotte, which came from Iglau to reinforce the army in front of Brunn, the evening before the battle of Austerlitz, would not then have had time to make this movement, which was followed by such fatal consequences to the allies.[3] It was only by means such as these, had the allies acted with prudence and vigour, that they could have hoped to make the French fall into their combinations: combinations which should have been calmly conceived, and vigorously executed. But the Quarter-master general, it has before been mentioned, though an officer of great personal courage, had not that confidence in himself which could enable him to give advice at the head-quarters, where the greatest degree of wisdom was requisite. Without regarding the difficulties thrown in his way, this officer, too easily, abandoned his own opinions, to adopt those of other people.