had already sent me three pieces of artillery; and that he could not send me any more, having his town to defend!" What could be de Ramsay's reasons for such a monstrous conduct, or who it was who inspired him with such a daring disobedience, I know not? 1. "His town"--as he called it--was defended by our army which covered it, being drawn up in battle about two hundred fathoms from it; and its safety depended entirely upon the event of a battle. 2. There were in Quebec about two hundred pieces of cannon, most of them twenty-four and thirty-six pounders. 3. Small field-pieces, two or three pounders--such as the palace battery--could they be of the least service for the defence of a town? 4. A commander of Quebec, as King's Lieutenant or sub-Lieutenant, such as de Ramsay was--not Governor,--or even M. de Vaudreuil himself, Governor General of Canada, at that moment in the town,--could they have any authority to refuse me all the assistance I could desire from Quebec, by my particular commission of Commander-in-Chief of the troops in Canada, when my army was at the gates of the town, and your army deployed ready to fight? A thousand other queries suggest themselves; but of what avail? I assembled immediately a council of war, composed of all the commanding officers of the several regiments, to hear their opinion as to what was to be done in our critical situation. Some of them maintained you were busy throwing up breastworks. Others, that you appeared bent on descending in the valley, in order to seize the bridge of boats on the St. Charles river with the hornwork, with the object of cutting off our communication with the left wing of our army, which remained at Beauport pursuant to the order signed by Montreuil. In effect, a movement your army made in that moment towards the windmill and Borgia's house, upon the edge of the height, seemed to favour this conjecture. But an instant afterwards, the Canadians having set fire to that house and chased you from it, you retook your former position. Others alleged, that the more we delayed attacking you, the more your army would be strong--imagining that your troops had not yet all landed. In short, there was not a single member of the war council who was not of opinion to charge upon you immediately. Can it be credited that these officers--to the dishonour of mankind--who were the most violent to attack you, denied it afterwards, and became the most ardent censors of my conduct in not deferring the battle! What could I do in my desperate situation? Even a Marshal Turenne would have been much puzzled to get out of such a dilemma, in which they had entangled me either through design or ignorance. I listened with attention to their opinion, without opening my lips, and at last answered them:--"It appears to me, gentlemen, that you are unanimous for giving battle; and that the only question now is, how to charge the enemy?" Montreuil said it would be better to attack in columns.