MONTCALM:--I agree with you, and am sensible that the longer the line, the weaker it is in its several parts. I am convinced that it is impossible to prevent a line from being forced; and I believed likewise that, landing on a coast where there are several leagues of it to be defended, equally susceptible of descent, is the same case as lines. He who attacks has all his force concentrated at a single point, which he may choose as he pleases; anywhere in the extent of his lines; on the contrary, he who is attacked in his entrenchments has his force divided over the whole extent of his lines, and does not know on what part of them the enemy has the intention to make his real attack, so that he must be everywhere equally strong and guarded over all the ground occupied by his army. Thus the head of a column of a great depth of ranks must infallibly pierce through lines who have only at most two or three men deep; and by feint attacks all over the front of a line, you cannot weaken one part of it by drawing troops from it to fortify another part of it, unless the point of the enemy's principal attack is manifestly known. It is certainly the same with regard to landings, where all the extent of the sea coast may be threatened at the same time, although it is a common opinion that a coast may be defended, and that an enemy may be repulsed in his attempt to make a descent by open force. I know not a better method to oppose a descent than to have bodies of troops in battle, ready to rush upon the enemy, with their bayonets upon their muskets, attacking the moment the enemy land, whilst they are yet few and in confusion from the disorder which must necessarily happen at their coming out of their boats, and before they can present a considerable front in battle. My project of defence was to encamp on rising ground at Quebec, called by the French, _Les Hauteurs d'Abraham_, and make Quebec serve as the centre and pivot to all my operations, since it was evident that the fate of Canada depended entirely on its being preserved to us or taken by you, which decided whether that colony should remain to its ancient possessors or become your prize. With this in view, I intrenched the borders of the St. Charles river, and remained encamped at Quebec until, receiving tidings of your fleet having arrived in the St. Lawrence river, M. de Levis, an officer of great merit and distinction, proposed to change the position of our camp, by carrying our left wing to the Sault de Montmorency, and our right to the St. Charles river: this, as you say, made it six miles long on the north side of Quebec, and gave us greater appearance of being on the offensive than on the defensive.