It was true that everyone was weary of the war and the sacrifices of men and money which the country was making; everyone deplored the complete stoppage of industry and commerce, and the misery which was its consequence, and everyone ardently desired the end of these sufferings and the rapid, the immediate conclusion of peace. But on what conditions? Did it mean that this ardently desired peace would be accepted on any conditions and at any price? On this capital point people in France had the fondest illusions, and found themselves most completely mistaken. Yes, they wanted peace, but they wanted it at the price of a good ransom which would permit the German Government to indemnify all those who had suffered damage either directly or indirectly from the war. Nor was that all. Besides a money indemnity, all were unanimous in demanding as “guarantees for the future” the cession of Alsace and Lorraine. That is the manner of peace they wanted, and if all Germany was tired of the war and desired its ending, all Germany considered it a crime on the part of France not to consent and not to understand that the hour had struck for her to surrender at discretion. People were exasperated with France for prolonging a hopeless struggle and by her obstinacy preventing a conclusion of peace for which the world had an immense need. In such a sense as this Germany was tired of the war, and had it been necessary to send even more soldiers to augment the million combatants already on French soil, had it been necessary to raise and again raise new levies in order to arrive at the goal, all Germany without exception--north, south, east, and west--would have given its last man capable of bearing arms. I will even go further. Supposing for a moment--such a supposition has no kind of foundation, but suppose for a single moment--that if Prussia or one or other of her allies had desired the end of the war under conditions that were easier for France, and supposing they had attempted to establish this view in the United Council of Ministers, public opinion would have swiftly reduced such a proposition to silence. The first Government to have attempted an enterprise of such a nature would have immediately been overturned by the general indignation of the whole people, who would have risen against it as a single man. A king or prince liberal enough to have proposed such a peace would have been driven out as a traitor to his country, and as unworthy to sit henceforward on the throne of his august ancestors. M. de Bismarck knew his people well, and expressed an indisputable truth when he told M. Jules Favre, at the interview of Ferrières, that the King himself could not conclude peace without the cession of Alsace and Lorraine.