I took the opportunity offered by this remark to revert to my former demand for an effective intervention on the part of Austria in concert with the other Powers. Commencing with the desirability of convoking a National Assembly, I went on to say that an armistice and the revictualling of Paris, which would have allowed us to hold elections, were exactly the things that Prussia had refused. “Perhaps,” said I, “Prussia may change her mind on this question and perhaps also allow of more tolerable conditions of peace if she sees that France is not isolated.” And I added that, if my information was accurate, the populace of the Austrian Empire was disposed to intervene, and that public opinion would see in helping France an opportunity of avenging Austria’s own defeat of 1866. The Hungarians in particular had been reported to me as fervent admirers of France. They would rise in a body to help us if the Government did not prevent them. But this was far from being M. de Beust’s view. There was certainly great and sincere sympathy for the French cause everywhere in the Austrian monarchy. But one must not exaggerate. To conclude from this that a war against Germany would be a popular war in Austria would be a great exaggeration and a great mistake. “Besides,” said he, lowering his voice, “we are absolutely lacking in the material means for a campaign.” And he frankly explained the whole situation that I have previously described and everywhere insisted that: “We are not armed, and it is too late and too dangerous to mobilise now.” Before leaving M. de Beust I confessed to him that my mission did not stop short with Vienna, but that I was also going to England. I asked him if he had no message for me to carry to the English Cabinet, and if Austria, under certain conditions, would not take part in common action. “I authorise you to say to Lord Granville that, if England wished effectively to intervene with the object of obtaining honourable conditions of peace for France, England would not be alone and Austria would go with her.” This answer, which might appear to be full of promise, did not signify very much and did not greatly compromise him who made it, in good faith I admit, but with the certainty that England would not put him to the necessity of keeping his word. The situation, therefore, was one of frightful simplicity. It was this:-- If the Powers--I do not of course refer to Russia, who was in a situation by herself--if the Powers had been able to intervene for France without exposing themselves to a war with Prussia, intervention would have taken place and France would not have remained alone to face Germany in negotiating for conditions of peace.