A Discourse of a Method for the Well Guiding of Reason: and the Discovery of Truth in the SciencesDescartes, René
PhilosophyPhilosophy
A Discourse of a Method for the Well Guiding of Reason: and the Discovery of Truth in the Sciences
Descartes, René
Methodology; Science -- Methodology
My second Maxime was, To be the most constant and resolute in my actions
that I could; and to follow with no less perseverance the most doubtfull
opinions, when I had once determined them, then if they had been the
most certain. Imitating herein Travellers, who having lost their way in
a Forrest, ought not to wander, turning now this way, and then that, and
less to abide in one place; but stil advance straight forwards, towards
one way, and not to change on slight occasions, although perhaps at
first Chance only mov'd them to determine that choice: For by that
means, if they do not go directly whither they desire, they will at
least arrive somewhere where they will probably be better then in the
midst of a Forrest. So the actions of this life admitting often of no
delay, its a most certain Truth, That when it is not in our power to
discern the truest opinions, we are to follow the most probable: Yea,
although we finde no more probability in the one then in the other, we
yet ought to determine some way, considering them afterwards no more as
doubtful in what they relate to practice; but as most true and certain;
forasmuch as the reason was so, which made us determine it. And this was
sufficient for that time to free me from all the remorse and repentance
which useth to perplex the consciences of those weak and staggering
minds, which inconstantly suffer themselves to passe to the practice of
those things as good, which they afterwards judge evill.
My third Maxime was, To endevour always rather to conquer my self then
Fortune; and to change my desires, rather then the order of the world:
and generally to accustome my self to beleeve, That there is nothing
wholly in our power but our thoughts; so that after we have done our
best, touching things which are without us, all whats wanting of success
in respect of us is absolutely impossible. And this alone seem'd
sufficient to hinder me from desiring any thing which I could not
acquire, and so to render me content. For our will naturally moving us
to desire nothing, but those things which our understanding presents in
some manner as possible, certain it is, that if we consider all the good
which is without us, as equally distant from our power, we should have
no more regret for the want of those which seem due to our births, when
without any fault of ours we shall be deprived of them, then we have in
wanting the possessions of the Kingdoms of _China_ or _Mexico_. And
making (as we say) vertue of necessity, we should no more desire to be
in health being sick, or free being in prison, then we now do, to have
bodies of as incorruptible a matter as diamonds, or wings to fly like
birds. But I confess, that a long exercise, and an often reiterated
meditation, is necessary to accustom us to look on all things with that
byass: And I beleeve, in this principally consists, the secret of those
Philosophers who formerly could snatch themselves from the Empire of
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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