A Discourse of a Method for the Well Guiding of Reason: and the Discovery of Truth in the SciencesDescartes, René
PhilosophyPhilosophy
A Discourse of a Method for the Well Guiding of Reason: and the Discovery of Truth in the Sciences
Descartes, René
Methodology; Science -- Methodology
things of which I found an _Idea_ in me, whether the possessing of them
were a perfection or no; and I was sure, that any of those which had any
imperfections were not in him, but that all others were. I saw that
doubtfulness, inconstancy, sorrow and the like, could not be in him,
seeing I could my self have wish'd to have been exempted from them.
Besides this, I had the _Ideas_ of divers sensible and corporeall
things; for although I supposed that I doted, and that all that I saw or
imagined was false; yet could I not deny but that these _Ideas_ were
truly in my thoughts. But because I had most evidently known in my self,
That the understanding Nature is distinct from the corporeall,
considering that all composition witnesseth a dependency, and that
dependency is manifestly a defect, I thence judged that it could not be
a perfection in God to be composed of those two Natures; and that by
consequence he was not so composed. But that if there were any Bodies in
the world, or els any intelligences, or other Natures which were not
wholly perfect, their being must depend from his power in such a manner,
that they could not subsist one moment without him.
Thence I went in search of other Truths; and having proposed _Geometry_
for my object, which I conceived as a continued Body, or a space
indefinitely spred in length, bredth, height or depth, divisible into
divers parts, which might take severall figures and bignesses, and be
moved and transposed every way. For the Geometricians suppose all this
in their object. I past through some of their most simple
demonstrations; and having observed that this great certaintie, which
all the world grants them, is founded only on this, that men evidently
conceived them, following the rule I already mentioned. I observed also
that there was nothing at all in them which ascertain'd me of the
existence of their object. As for example, I well perceive, that
supposing a Triangle, three angles necessarily must be equall to two
right ones: but yet nevertheless I saw nothing which assured me that
there was a Triangle in the world. Whereas returning to examine the
_Idea_ which I had of a perfect Being, _I_ found its existence comprised
in it, in the same manner as it was comprised in that of a Triangle,
where the three angles are equall to two right ones; or in that of a
sphere, where all the parts are equally distant from the center. Or even
yet more evidently, and that by consequence, it is at least as certain
that God, who is that perfect Being, is, or exists, as any demonstration
in Geometry can be.
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