soldiers were killed, and 20,000 taken prisoners. As soon as Claudius perceived the probable result of the battle, he fled precipitately with thirty vessels. The Carthaginians did not lose a single ship or man on this occasion. This was the most signal and disastrous defeat which the Romans had suffered at sea since the commencement of the war. According to Polybius, Claudius was tried, condemned, and very severely punished. The other consul, Lucius Pullus, was not more successful, though his want of success did not, as in the case of Claudius, arise from ignorance and obstinacy. He was ordered to sail from Syracuse with a fleet of 120 galleys, and 800 transports, the latter laden with provisions and stores for the army before Lilibaeum. As the army was much pressed for necessaries, and the consul himself was not ready to put to sea directly, he sent the quaestors before him with a small squadron. The Carthaginians, who were very watchful, and had the best intelligence of all the Romans were doing, having learnt that the consul was at sea with a large fleet, sent 100 galleys to cruize off Heraclea. As soon as the squadron under the quaestors came in sight, the Carthaginian admiral, though he mistook it for the consular fleet, yet resolved to engage it: but the quaestors, having received orders not to hazard a battle if they could possibly avoid, took refuge behind some rocks, where they were attacked by the enemy. The Romans defended themselves so well with balistae and other engines, which they had erected on the rocks, that the Carthaginian admiral, after having captured a few transports, was obliged to draw off his fleet. In the mean time, the light vessels, employed on the lookout, informed him that the whole consular fleet were directing their course for Lilibaeum: his obvious plan was to engage this fleet before it could join that of the quæstors; he therefore steered his course to meet them. But the consul was equally averse with the quaestors to hazard the supply of the army by a battle, and he, therefore, also took shelter near some rocks. The Carthaginian admiral was afraid to attack him in this position, but resolved to watch him: while thus employed his pilots observed certain indications of an approaching storm, which induced him to take shelter on the other side of Cape Pachynum. He had scarcely doubled the cape, when the storm arose with such violence that the whole Roman fleet was destroyed. According to Polybius, not one vessel, not even a plank, was saved out of a fleet which consisted of 120 galleys and 800 transports.