The disadvantage of such a method is, of course, that the reader must look elsewhere for details, for the notices of a particular action, and the records of particular regiments. He must look for these to the large histories of the war, which will amply supply his curiosity in good time. But the advantage of the method consists in that it provides, as I hope, a foundation upon which all this bewildering multitude of detailed reading can repose. I set out, then, to give, as it were, the alphabet of the campaign, and I begin in this volume with the preliminaries to it--that is, its great political causes, deep rooted in the past; the particular and immediate causes which led to the outbreak of war; an estimate of the forces engaged; and the inception of hostilities. PLAN OF THIS BOOK. This first volume will cover three parts. In Part I. I shall write of The Causes of the War. In Part II. I shall Contrast the Forces Opposed. In Part III. (the briefest) I shall describe the First Shock. In Part I., where I deal first with the general or historical causes of the war, later with the particulars, I shall:-- 1. Define the German object which led up to it. 2. Show how this object conflicted with the wills of other nations. 3. Briefly sketch the rise of Prussia and of her domination over North Germany. 4. Define the position of Austria-Hungary in the matter, and thus close the general clauses. 5. The particular causes of the war will next be dealt with; the curious challenge thrown down to Great Britain by the German Fleet _before_ the German Empire had made secure its position on the Continent; the French advance upon Morocco; the coalition of the Balkan States against the remainder of the Turkish Empire in Europe. 6. Lastly, in this First Part, I shall describe the immediate occasion of the war and its surroundings: the ultimatum issued by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the little kingdom of Servia. In Part II. I will attempt to present the forces opposed at the outbreak of war. First, the contrast in the geographical position of the Germanic Allies with their enemies, the French, the English, and the Russians. Secondly, the numbers of trained men prepared and the numbers of reserves available in at least the first year to the various numbers in conflict. Thirdly, the way in which the various enemies had thought of the coming war (which was largely a matter of theory in the lack of experience); in what either party has been right, and in what wrong, as events proved; and with what measure of foresight the various combatants entered the field.