A General View of Positivism: Or, Summary exposition of the System of Thought and LifeComte, Auguste
Philosophy
A General View of Positivism: Or, Summary exposition of the System of Thought and Life
Comte, Auguste
Positivism
This fundamental doctrine of Positivism is not to be attributed in the
full breadth of its meanings to any single thinker. It is the slow
result of a vast process carried out in separate departments, which
began with the first use of our intellectual powers, and which is only
just completed in those who exhibit those powers in their highest form.
During the long period of her infancy Humanity has been preparing
this the most precious of her intellectual attainments, as the basis
for the only system of life which is permanently adapted to our
nature. The doctrine has to be demonstrated in all the more essential
cases from observation only, except so far as we admit argument from
analogy. Deductive argument is not admissible, except in such cases
as are evidently compounded of others in which the proof given has
been sufficient. Thus, for instance, we are authorized by sound logic
to assert the existence of laws of weather; though most of these are
still, and, perhaps, always will be, unknown. For it is clear that
meteorological phenomena result from a combination of astronomical,
physical and chemical influences, each of which has been proved to
be subject to invariable laws. But in all phenomena which are not
thus reducible, we must have recourse to inductive reasoning; for a
principle which is the basis of all deduction cannot be itself deduced.
Hence it is that the doctrine, being so entirely foreign as it is to
our primitive mental state, requires such a long course of preparation.
Without such preparation even the greatest thinkers could not
anticipate it. It is true that in some cases metaphysical conceptions
of a law have been formed before the proof really required had been
furnished. But they were never of much service, except so far as they
generalized in a more or less confused way the analogies naturally
suggested by the laws which had actually been discovered in simpler
phenomena. Besides, such assertions always remained very doubtful and
very barren in result, until they were based upon some outline of a
really Positive theory. Thus, in spite of the apparent potency of
this metaphysical method, to which modern intellects are so addicted,
the conception of an External Order is still extremely imperfect in
many of the most cultivated minds, because they have not verified it
sufficiently in the most intricate and important class of phenomena,
the phenomena of society. I am not, of course, speaking of the few
thinkers who accept my discovery of the principal laws of Sociology.
Such uncertainty in a subject so closely related to all others,
produces great confusion in men’s minds, and affects their perception
of an invariable order, even in the simplest subjects. A proof of this
is the utter delusion into which most geometricians of the present day
have fallen with respect to what they call the Calculus of Chances;
a conception which presupposes that the phenomena considered are not
subject to law.
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