A General View of Positivism: Or, Summary exposition of the System of Thought and Life — John Shaqi
A General View of Positivism: Or, Summary exposition of the System of Thought and LifeComte, Auguste
Philosophy
A General View of Positivism: Or, Summary exposition of the System of Thought and Life
Comte, Auguste
Positivism
Here, then, we are met by a serious difficulty. The construction of
the objective basis for the Positive synthesis imposes two conditions
which seem, at first sight, incompatible. On the one hand we must
allow the intellect to be free, or else we shall not have the full
benefit of its services; and, on the other, we must control its natural
tendency to unlimited digressions. The problem was insoluble, so long
as the study of the natural economy did not include Sociology. But
as soon as the Positive spirit extends to the treatment of social
questions, these at once take precedence of all others, and thus the
moral point of view becomes paramount. Objective science, proceeding
from without inwards, falls at last into natural harmony with the
subjective or moral principle, the superiority of which it had for
so long a time resisted. As a mere speculative question it may be
considered as proved to the satisfaction of every true thinker, that
the social point of view is logically and scientifically supreme
over all others, being the only point from which all our scientific
conceptions can be regarded as a whole. Yet its influence can never be
injurious to the progress of other Positive studies; for these, whether
for the sake of their method or of their subject matter, will always
continue to be necessary as an introduction to the final science.
Indeed the Positive system gives the highest sanction and the most
powerful stimulus to all preliminary sciences, by insisting on the
relation which each of them bears to the great whole, Humanity.
Thus the foundation of social science bears out the statement made at
the beginning of this work, that the intellect would, under Positivism,
accept its proper position of subordination to the heart. The
recognition of this, which is the subjective principle of Positivism,
renders the construction of a complete system of human life possible.
The antagonism which, since the close of the Middle Ages, has arisen
between Reason and Feeling, was an anomalous though inevitable
condition. It is now for ever at an end; and the only system which can
really satisfy the wants of our nature, individually or collectively,
is therefore ready for our acceptance. As long as the antagonism
existed, it was hopeless to expect that Social Sympathy could do much
to modify the preponderance of self-love in the affairs of life. But
the case is different as soon as reason and sympathy are brought into
active co-operation. Separately, their influence in our imperfect
organization is very feeble; but combined it may extend indefinitely.
It will never, indeed, be able to do away with the fact that practical
life must, to a large extent, be regulated by interested motives; yet
it may introduce a standard of morality inconceivably higher than any
that has existed in the past, before these two modifying forces could
be made to combine their action upon our stronger and lower instincts.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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