A Handbook of Ethical TheoryFullerton, George Stuart
Philosophy
A Handbook of Ethical Theory
Fullerton, George Stuart
Ethics
Yet it is not strictly true to say that they move of themselves. They are
under control, and the successive steps follow upon each other not
without direction. They serve as expressions of the will to take the
walk, and they are adjusted to the end consciously held in view. That
attention is not fixed upon the individual steps does not remove them
from the sphere of the voluntary, in a proper sense of the words. They
are expressions of the man's will, even if they be not the result of a
conscious series of deliberations and decisions. Whether we shall use the
term decision in connection with the single step is rather a question of
verbal usage than of the determination of fact. We have seen that
decisions shade down gradually, from those quite unmistakable and
characteristic, to occurrences far less characteristic and more
disputable. The consciousness of deliberation and decision does not
disappear abruptly at some point in the series. It fades away, as the
light of day gradually passes, through twilight, into the shades of
night. And actions not directly recognizable as consciously voluntary may
be obviously under voluntary control. They weave themselves, with actions
more palpably voluntary and higher in the scale, into those complicated
patterns determined by the conscious selection of an end. As long as they
serve their purpose, and require no effort, they may remain inconspicuous
and unconsidered. But, as soon as a check is met with, attention is
directed upon them and they become the subject of conscious voluntary
control.
38. ENDS NOT CONSCIOUSLY CHOSEN.--In the above illustration the end
which determines the character of a long chain of actions has been
deliberately chosen. It is a consciously selected end. When, however, we
contemplate critically the lives of our fellow-men, we seem to become
aware of the fact that many of them act in unconsciousness of the
ultimate end upon which their actions converge. The attention is taken up
with minor decisions, and takes no note of the permanent trend of the
will.
Thus, the selfish man may be unaware of the significance of the whole
series of choices which he makes in a day; the malicious man may not
realize that he is animated by the settled purpose to injure his
neighbors; one may be law-abiding without ever having resolved to obey
the laws through the course of a life. If called upon to account for this
or that subordinate decision, each may exhaust his ingenuity in assigning
false causes, while ignoring the permanent attitude of the will revealed
in the series of decisions as a whole and giving them what consistency
they possess.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account