obtained from a survey of nature and human affairs, in determining the probability of certain professed miracles having proceeded from him. It is one thing to infer from the experience of life another to imagine the character of God from the gratuitous conceptions of our own minds.' Although Dr. Newman apparently fails to perceive that he himself thus makes reason the criterion of miracles and therefore incurs the condemnation with which our quotation opens, the very indecision of his argument illustrates the dilemma in which divines are placed. Dr. Mozley, however, still more directly condemns the principle we are discussing, that the doctrine must be the criterion of the miracle, although he also, as we have seen elsewhere, substantially affirms it. He says: 'The position that the revelation proves the miracle, and not the miracles the revelation, admits of a good qualified meaning; but taken literally, it is a double offense against the rule, that things are properly proved by the proper proof of them; for a supernatural fact is the proper proof of supernatural doctrine, while a supernatural doctrine on the other hand is certainly not a proper proof of a supernatural fact.' "This statement is obviously true, but it is equally undeniable that, their origin being uncertain, miracles have no evidential force. How far then, we may inquire in order thoroughly to understand the position, can doctrines prove the reality of miracles or determine the agency by which they are performed? In the case of moral truths within the limits of reason, it is evident that doctrines, which are in accordance with our idea of what is good and right do not require miraculous evidence at all. They can secure acceptance by their own merits alone. At the same time it is universally admitted that the truth or goodness of a doctrine could not attest the divine origin of a miracle. Such truths, however, have no proper connection with revelation at all. 'These truths,' to quote the words of Bishop Atterbury, 'were of themselves sufficiently obvious and plain, and needed not a divine testimony to make them plainer. But the truths which are necessary in this manner to be attested, are those which are of positive institution; those which if God had not pleased to reveal them, human reason could not have discovered; and those, which, even now, they are revealed, human reason cannot fully account for, and perfectly comprehend.' How is it possible then that reason, or the 'moral nature of man' can approve as good, or appreciate the fitness of, doctrines which in their very nature are beyond the criterion of reason. What reply, for instance, can reason give to any appeal to it regarding the doctrine of the trinity or of the incarnation? If doctrines, the truth and goodness of which are apparent, do not afford any evidence of divine revelation, how can doctrines which reason can neither discover nor comprehend attest the divine origin of miracles? Dr.